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 Abstract 
Agricultural markets are best characterized as oligopsonistic markets; usually many 
farmers face only few manufacturers. The raw milk market in Germany exhibits a 
high concentration of dairy processors opposed to a large number of dairy farmers. 
In such a market structure, concerns regarding buyer market power are often raised. 
Therefore, the German federal cartel authority conducted a sector survey on the 
raw milk market investigating buyer market power of dairy processors. The inquiry 
concluded that the competition on the raw milk market is imperfect due to high 
concentration of dairy processors, high market transparency regarding neighboring 
dairies’ prices, limited switching possibilities of farmers to other processors due to 
long-term contracts and the obligation to supply the entire production quantity. 
This supply obligation in combination with long-term contracts may lead to market 
foreclosure as there is no freely available milk on the market (FCO 2012). 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze imperfect competition on the raw milk 
market in Germany focusing on (i) market foreclosing effects of contracts (ii) 
estimating buyer market power of the dairy industry in the federal states and (iii) 
analyzing the effects of the spatial nature of the market on dairies’ price setting. 
The methodologies applied to elaborate on the objective of this thesis comprise 
game theoretic modelling to analyze the effects of contracts, empirical estimation 
of market power in the framework of the conjectural variation approach, and a 
spatial economics approach to investigate dairies’ pricing behavior depending on 
space. For the empirical analyses a data set on processors’ and farmers’ 
characteristics for the time span 2001-2012 is used. 
The results of the theoretical analysis show that long-term contracts in combination 
with the supply obligation can foreclose markets under certain assumptions on 
farmer’s risk attitude and probability of rival’s entry. The estimation of the market 
power parameter in the framework of the conjectural variation approach results in 
evidence for an oligopsonistic market structure in six federal states and also on the 
national level. The spatial investigation shows that space is especially important for 
cooperatives and results in different effects in the North and the South of Germany. 
The findings give insights into the competitiveness and behavior of the German 
raw milk market which are important regarding the ongoing concentration of the 
dairy processors and the increasing volatility of raw milk prices. 
Keywords: imperfect competition, oligopsonistic markets, buyer market 
power, exclusive contracts, conjectural variation, spatial regression 
 
 Zusammenfassung 
Agrarmärkte weisen generell eine oligopsonistische Struktur auf; wenigen 
Unternehmen der Verarbeitungsindustrie stehen eine Vielzahl von produzierenden 
Betrieben gegenüber. Bei einer solchen Marktstruktur liegt die Vermutung eines 
unvollkommenen Wettbewerbs nahe. Die Situation auf dem deutschen 
Beschaffungsmarkt für Rohmilch wurde vom Bundeskartellamt in einer 
Sektoruntersuchung betrachtet. Es wird festgestellt, dass der Wettbewerb auf dem 
Beschaffungsmarkt regional auf Grund von Konzentration der Molkereien, hoher 
Markttransparenz über die Preise benachbarter Molkereien, begrenzter 
Wechselmöglichkeiten der Erzeuger zu anderen Molkereien eingeschränkt ist. Es 
wird vermutet, dass die vollständige Andienungspflicht in Kombination mit 
langfristigen Verträgen eine marktverschließende Wirkung haben kann, da es keine 
freie Rohmilch auf dem Markt gibt, um die Wettbewerb bestehen könnte. (FCO 
2012) 
Das Ziel dieser Dissertation ist es, den Wettbewerb auf dem Rohmilchmarkt in 
Deutschland zu analysieren. Dazu wird (i) die marktverschließende Wirkung von 
Verträgen zwischen Molkereien und Milchproduzenten theoretisch untersucht, (ii) 
Marktmacht der Molkereiindustrie in den Bundesländern empirisch geschätzt und 
(iii) in einer räumlichen Regression der Einfluss des begrenzten Marktradius auf 
den Preis untersucht.  
Anhand eines spieltheoretischen Modells wird die marktverschließende Wirkung 
von Verträgen untersucht, während die Marktmacht der Molkereiindustrie mit dem 
„conjectural variation approach“ empirisch für die Bundesländer geschätzt wird. 
Ebenfalls empirisch wird der Einfluss des Raumes auf die Preisbildung der 
Molkereien mit Hilfe einer räumlichen Regression geschätzt. Für die empirischen 
Analysen wird ein Datensatz mit molkerei- und landwirtschaftsspezifischen Daten 
für die Jahre 2001-2012 herangezogen.  
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass langfristige Verträge in Kombination mit der 
vollständigen Andienungspflicht unter bestimmten Annahmen über die 
Risikoeinstellung des Milchproduzenten und die Eintrittswahrscheinlichkeiten 
eines Rivalen wettbewerbshindernd sein können und den Eintritt von neuen 
Molkereien in den Markt verhindern. Die Marktmachtschätzung der 
Molkereiindustrie zeigt, dass die Marktstruktur in sechs Bundesländern sowie auf 
nationaler Ebene oligopsonistisch ist. Die räumliche Untersuchung zeigt, dass der 
Raum vor allem für Genossenschaften eine Rolle spielt und die Effekte im Norden 
und Süden Deutschlands unterschiedlich sind. Die Ergebnisse geben Einblicke in 
die Wettbewerbssituation und das Marktverhalten des deutschen Rohmilchmarktes, 
welche insbesondere im Hinblick auf die weitere Konsolidierung der 
Milchwirtschaft und der Volatilität der Milchpreise relevant sind. 
Schlagwörter: unvollkommener Wettbewerb, oligopsonistische Märkte, Käufer 
Marktmacht, exklusive Verträge, conjectural variation, räumliche 
Regressionsmodelle 
i 
 
Contents 
1 Introduction and overview of the thesis ...................................................... 1 
1.1 Research objective and structure of the thesis ...................................... 2 
1.1.1 Research questions .................................................................. 3 
1.1.2 Structure of the thesis .............................................................. 6 
1.2 The German dairy sector: Policy and structure .................................... 7 
1.2.1 Policies relevant for the EU dairy sector ................................. 8 
1.2.2 The structure of German dairy sector .................................... 12 
1.3 Measuring market power .................................................................... 22 
1.3.1 A definition of market power ................................................ 23 
1.3.2 Methodologies applied .......................................................... 25 
1.4 Summary of main findings and conclusion ........................................ 32 
1.4.1 Summary of main findings .................................................... 32 
1.4.2 Conclusion and limitations .................................................... 38 
1.5 References .......................................................................................... 41 
2 Entry deterring effects of contractual relations ....................................... 47 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................ 48 
2.2 Literature review ................................................................................ 53 
2.3 The Model .......................................................................................... 56 
2.3.1 The basic model ..................................................................... 58 
2.3.2 Risk attitude and uncertainty of entry .................................... 61 
2.3.3 Numerical example ................................................................ 65 
2.4 Discussion .......................................................................................... 69 
2.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 71 
2.6 References .......................................................................................... 74 
 
  
ii   1.1 Research objective and structure of the thesis 
3 Conjectural variations on the German raw milk market– an empirical 
investigation of buyer market power  ....................................................... 77 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................ 78 
3.2 The German raw milk market ............................................................. 80 
3.3 The conjectural variation approach .................................................... 83 
3.4 Theoretical framework ....................................................................... 86 
3.5 Empirical model ................................................................................. 88 
3.6 Data Description ................................................................................. 91 
3.7 Estimation results ............................................................................... 93 
3.8 Discussion .......................................................................................... 96 
3.9 Conclusion .......................................................................................... 98 
3.10 References ........................................................................................ 101 
3.11 Appendix .......................................................................................... 104 
4 Pricing behavior of cooperatives and investor-owned dairies under 
spatial competition .................................................................................... 105 
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 106 
4.2 Relevant literature on spatial pricing ................................................ 108 
4.3 Data and Empirical Model................................................................ 113 
4.4 Results .............................................................................................. 119 
4.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................ 127 
4.6 References ........................................................................................ 130 
 
  
  
iii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1: Data used ............................................................................................... 14 
Table 1.2: Concentration of dairies in terms of processing quantities in 2012 ....... 21 
Table 2.1: Comparison of scenario 1 and 2 ............................................................ 60 
Table 2.2: Numerical example of the basic model .................................................. 66 
Table 3.1: Dairies’ concentration according to processing quantities in 2012 ....... 82 
Table 3.2: Description of model variables .............................................................. 92 
Table 3.3: Supply elasticity ..................................................................................... 93 
Table 3.4: National market power parameter .......................................................... 93 
Table 3.5: Market power parameters for the federal states ..................................... 95 
Table 3.6: Oligopsonistic price distortion ............................................................... 96 
Table 3.7: Correlation coefficients between conduct parameter and concentration 98 
Table 3.8: Estimation of supply function .............................................................. 104 
Table 4.1: Summary of relevant literature ............................................................ 110 
Table 4.2: The milk market in 2012 – key facts ................................................... 116 
Table 4.3: Regression results ................................................................................ 120 
 
  
iv   1.1 Research objective and structure of the thesis 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Number of dairy facilities ..................................................................... 15 
Figure 1.2: Dairy processing facilities’ structural change ...................................... 17 
Figure 1.3: Conventional raw milk price developments ......................................... 19 
Figure 1.4: Federal states’ raw milk price differences ............................................ 20 
Figure 1.5: Monopsony market ............................................................................... 24 
Figure 1.6: Illustration of competition in the backyard ........................................... 30 
Figure 1.7: Inverted U-shaped relation of price and space ..................................... 31 
Figure 1.8: Effective entry deterrence depending on k and r .................................. 33 
Figure 1.9: Relation between price and space of COOPs and IOFs in the North and 
the South ................................................................................................................. 36 
Figure 2.1: Effective entry deterrence depending on k and r .................................. 64 
Figure 2.2: Development of compensations depending on probability .................. 68 
Figure 3.1: Regional distribution of milk production and dairy processing facilities 
in 2012 .................................................................................................................... 81 
Figure 4.1: Relation between price and space of COOPs and IOFs in the North and 
the South ............................................................................................................... 121 
Figure 4.2: Relation between price and share of COOPs in neighbourhood ........ 127 
 
  
  
v 
 
Abbreviations 
AMI  Agrarmarkt Informations-Gesellschaft mbH 
ARC  Act against Restraints of Competition  
BB  Berlin and Brandenburg 
FCO  Federal Cartel Office 
BSE  Bovine Spongiforme Enzephalopathie 
BW  Baden-Wuerttemberg 
BY  Bavaria 
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy 
COOP  Cooperative 
Ct.  Cent 
DG AGRI EC Directorate General on Agriculture 
EC  European Commission 
EMB  European Milk Board 
EPRS  European Parliament Research Service 
EU  European Union 
FADN  Farm Accountancy Data Network 
FOB  Free on Board 
HE  Hesse 
IOF  Investor-Owned firm 
Kg  Kilogram 
LS  Lower Saxony 
MC  Marginal Costs 
MIV  Milchindustrieverband 
MRP  Marginal Revenue Product 
MV  Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania  
vi   1.1 Research objective and structure of the thesis 
NW  North Rhine-Westphalia 
PDO  Protected Designation of Origin 
PGI  Protected Geographical Indication 
RP  Rhineland Palatinate 
SH  Schleswig-Holstein 
SL  Saarland 
SLX  Spatially Lagged Explanatory Variable  
SN  Saxony 
ST  Saxony-Anhalt 
TH  Thuringia 
UD  Uniform Delivered 
 
1 
 
The European Union (EU) is the world’s leading exporter of dairy products and the 
milk market as a whole provides one of the most important agricultural goods in 
terms of value, representing about 15% of the total agricultural output in 2014 
(EPRS 2015). Within the EU, Germany is the largest milk producer accounting for 
20% of EU milk production (EUROSTAT 2015). The competitiveness of the 
European dairy sector is driven by the abolition of the quota regime, higher 
productivity and increasing concentration and is consequently undergoing 
substantial changes. Furthermore, recent developments like less demand for milk 
products from China, the Russian embargo and the weak purchasing power of oil 
exporting countries lead to increasing uncertainty and price volatility.  
Imperfect competition is generally a topic of high interest on the milk market. 
The increasing concentration of dairy processing facilities (AMI 2014) and 
farmers’ access limited to only those dairy processors within a certain radius 
around the farm, raise concerns regarding buyer market power of dairy processors 
(FCO 2009; FCO 2012). Formel-Kapitel (nächstes) Abschnitt 1 
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2   1.1 Research objective and structure of the thesis 
After the raw milk price crisis in 2009, and in order to prepare the market for 
the time following the milk quota regime towards a market-oriented future, the 
European Commission (EC) has launched the so called “milk package” in 2012. 
Apart from other measures targeting the dairy supply chain, compulsory written 
contracts between dairy processors and raw milk farmers are supposed to 
strengthen the farmers’ position on the market (EC 2014). However, long-term 
contracts can also limit farmers’ flexibility and lead to imperfect competition. 
Addressing concerns about imperfect competition in the German dairy sector, the 
German federal cartel authority (FCO) initiated a sector inquiry on the milk market 
in 2008. Regarding imperfect competition on the raw milk market, it is claimed 
that long-term contracts in combination with the obligation to supply the whole 
production quantity to a dairy processor leads to a lack of freely available raw milk 
on the market which could lead to a market foreclosure (FCO 2012). 
1.1 Research objective and structure of the thesis 
The overall objective of this thesis is to investigate imperfect competition on the 
raw milk market in Germany. Therefore, the potential market foreclosing effects of 
exclusive contracts are analyzed in a game theoretic framework. Further, market 
power is estimated in two empirical studies. In the first study, market power of the 
dairy industry is estimated on the national and federal state level. The second 
empirical study investigates the effects of space on dairies’ pricing, also giving 
evidence on potential market power. The underlying research questions and their 
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contribution to the literature are presented in the following. The methodologies to 
answer these research questions are described in detail in chapter 1.3.2. 
1.1.1 Research questions 
To address the objective of this thesis three research questions are specified, each 
contributing to a different strand of the literature.  
(I) Can long-term contracts between dairy processors and farmers result in 
entry barriers for rival dairy processors? 
The “milk package” provided by the EC suggests to use compulsory 
written contracts to strengthen farmers’ bargaining position (for further 
details on EU dairy policy see chapter 1.2.1) (EC 2014). Since contracts in 
the past had not been clearly specified, contracts should now include 
specific criteria that support farmers and help to achieve fair prices (e.g. 
details on price, volume and duration of contract). However, the German 
cartel authority raises concerns on the market foreclosing effects of such 
long-term contracts in combination with the farmers’ obligation to deliver 
the whole production amount (FCO 2012).  
The antitrust literature analyzes anti-competitive effects of exclusive 
contracts, mostly in a game theoretic model setting (Aghion and Bolton 
1987; Bork 1978; Rasmusen et al. 1991; Segal and Whinston 2000). 
Applying this theory to the milk market provides a way to analyze the 
4   1.1 Research objective and structure of the thesis 
effects of imperfect competition that may result from entry deterring 
effects of exclusive contracts between dairy farmers and processors on the 
structure of the raw milk market. While most of the literature focusing on 
entry deterring effects of exclusive contracts analyzes seller market power 
(e.g. Aghion and Bolton 1987; Bork 1978; Rasmusen et al. 1991; Segal and 
Whinston 2000), literature discussing exclusive contracts in an 
oligopsonistic setting is sparse (MacDonald et al. 2004; Vavra 2009). In 
addition, risk behavior of farmers has not been analyzed in the framework 
of entry deterring effects of exclusive contracts (Innes and Sexton 1994 
only discuss its implication). Therefore, chapter 2 of this thesis contributes 
to the literature by presenting a game theoretic model, which contrasts the 
models of the antitrust literature and is able to explain the signing of an 
exclusive contract with uncertainty of rival’s entry and risk aversion of the 
signer. 
(II) Does the German dairy industry exercise buyer market power?  
The estimation of dairy industry’s buyer market power on a national and 
federal state level addresses the concerns regarding buyer market power of 
the dairy industry and the positive correlation of market power and 
industry concentration (a.o. FCO 2009; FCO 2012; Tribl and Salhofer 
2013). 
To estimate buyer market power, the conjectural variation approach has 
been frequently used (e.g. Muth and Wohlgenant 1999; Gohin and 
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Guyomard 2000, Anders 2008, Sckokai 2009, Mérel 2009 and 2011, 
Soregaroli et al. 2011, Sckokai et al. 2013). This approach estimates the 
degree of imperfect competition as the deviation from perfect competition 
(Bresnahan 1989; Appelbaum 1982). Studies specifically analyzing buyer 
market power of the dairy industry have been conducted by Perekhozhuk et 
al. (2011) for Hungary, Perekhozhuk et al. (2014) for Ukraine and Scalco 
and Braga (2014) for Brazil. Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by 
providing the first national and federal state level analysis of buyer market 
power for the German dairy industry. 
(III) How does the spatial restriction of a dairy’s input market area influence 
pricing behavior? 
Due to raw milk being highly perishable and high transportation costs, a 
dairy can only source from a geographically limited area. Farmers, on the 
other hand, can only deliver to selected dairies. Therefore, a dairy might 
have the opportunity to exercise buyer market power when there are only 
few competitors in their spatial environment. It is of interest how space, 
representing distance to competing dairies and transportation cost, 
influences raw milk price setting. Further, it is worth analyzing the effects 
of competing dairies’ characteristics, such as their legal form, on raw milk 
pricing.  
6   1.1 Research objective and structure of the thesis 
The literature provides studies that theoretically and empirically analyze 
the effects of space on price setting (see Sexton 1990; Rogers and Sexton 
1994; Alvarez et al. 2000; Zhang and Sexton 2001; Fousekis 2011a and b; 
Tribl 2012 for a theoretical analysis and Alvarez et al. 2000; Huck et al. 
2006, Graubner et al. 2011 and Koller 2012 for an empirical investigation). 
Chapter 4 summarizes possible effects of space on price setting offered in 
the literature. Adding to the relevant empirical literature, a spatial 
economics approach is conducted that distinguishes between legal forms of 
dairies while incorporating neighboring dairies’ characteristics and the 
different market structures in the North and the South of Germany. 
Furthermore, the competitive yardstick theory that suggests a positive 
effect of cooperatives’ (COOPs) prices on investor-owned firms’ (IOFs) 
pricing (Cotterill 1987; Sexton 1990; Fousekis 2011a; Hanisch et al. 2013) 
is investigated in this spatial framework. 
1.1.2 Structure of the thesis 
Following a brief description of the characteristics of the German dairy sector, the 
remainder of this introductory chapter gives an overview on the methodologies 
employed to answer the research questions and concludes with a summary of the 
main findings as well as an outlook on potential for future research. Chapters 2-4 
constitute the main part of the thesis, addressing the research questions and the 
objective of this thesis in independent analyses.  
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Chapter 2 answers research question (I) by analyzing anti-competitive effects of 
contractual relations in the dairy sector in a theoretical analysis. This chapter 
contains the published article Zavelberg, Y., T. Heckelei and C. Wieck (2016). 
Entry deterring effects of contractual relations in the dairy processing sector, Bio-
based and Applied Economics 5(1): 83-98. The article in chapter 3 estimates 
market power of the dairy industry on the national and federal stat level, addressing 
research question (II). An earlier version, published as Zavelberg, Y., C. Wieck and 
T. Heckelei (2015): “Conjectural variations on the German raw milk market – An 
empirical investigation of oligopsony power”, has been presented at the 2015 
AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting in San Francisco. Finally, incorporating 
the spatial dimension of the market and the different market structure in North and 
South Germany, a spatial regression approach is used to analyze research question 
(III) in chapter 4. It is based on the paper by Zavelberg, Y. and H. Storm (2015): 
“Pricing behavior of cooperatives and investor-owned dairies in a spatial market 
setting”, which is currently under review at the German Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. 
1.2 The German dairy sector: Policy and structure 
In order to analyze imperfect competition on the German raw milk market a 
profound understanding of the dairy sector including market characteristics and 
policy regulations is essential. This section first presents the relevant policy 
regulations and then describes the data set that is used for the analysis of the 
8   1.2 The German dairy sector: Policy and structure 
structure of the milk market with respect to the dairy industry and dairy farmers as 
well as the development of raw milk prices. This data set is also used for the 
empirical studies of this thesis (chapters 3 and 4). 
1.2.1 Policies relevant for the EU dairy sector  
Milk quota 
With the “Health Check” reform in 2008, the EU took the decision to abolish the 
milk quota regime, which has been in place since 1984 (EC 2009). This restriction 
on production quantities had been implemented to reduce the imbalance between 
supply and demand. A period of increasing price support led to a large surplus of 
raw milk towards the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. The 
intervention system underlying the price support scheme made the EC buy and 
store large volumes of butter and skimmed milk powder leading to the so called 
“butter mountains”. Therefore, the milk quota system was introduced, that 
specified a maximum production quantity for each member state. In Germany, this 
national quota quantity was broken down to each dairy farmer. If the national quota 
was exceeded, a levy (“superlevy”) had to be paid. Addressing the increasing 
demand for dairy products in recent years which is assumed to continue in the 
future, the quota regime was abolished in 2015. The deregulation of the market 
shall liberalize trade and improve the competiveness of the sector such that the EU 
dairy sector is able to respond to the increased world market demand. In order to 
prepare the market for the abolishment of the quota a soft phasing out of the quota 
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was applied that increased the quota by 1% every year until 2015. (EC 2009; EPRS 
2015; EC 2015) 
Milk package 
Responding to the milk price crisis in 2009 and considering the future 
competitiveness and sustainability of the milk market, the EC has launched the 
“milk package” in October 2012 (EC 2012). The “milk package” aims at 
strengthening producers’ market position by setting criteria for the formation of 
producer organizations and specifying possibilities for Member States to regulate 
protected designation of origin (PDO)/protected geographical indication (PGI) 
cheese supply. Further, the milk package contains suggestions for Member States 
to establish compulsory written contracts between milk farmers and IOFs to ensure 
an equal distribution of risks between farmers and processors. Contractual 
agreements should not only become compulsory but also contain a minimum 
standard of specified criteria (e.g. details on price, volume and duration of 
contract). Due to their specific ownership structure, COOPs are exempted from this 
policy. The milk package will be applied until October 2020. (EC 2014) 
CAP reform 2014-2020 
Over the last few years, volatile global dairy prices have influenced the domestic 
price developments. After a price peak in January 2014, prices dropped strongly 
due to low world market demand and the Russian embargo. The Russian embargo 
10   1.2 The German dairy sector: Policy and structure 
on European products since August 2014 revealed that the market needs to be 
prepared for sudden shocks and crises. Adding to the low world the low world 
market demand, the Russian embargo further limits export possibilities for dairy 
processors, which is detrimental for raw milk prices (EPRS 2015). With the latest 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for the period 2014-2020, dairy 
farmers are provided with a safety net that offers support in case of external 
uncertainties. Further, the public intervention and private storage aid systems shall 
be improved to be more reactive and efficient (EC 2013a). In addition, a milk 
observatory was established in April 2014 to improve transparency of the market 
by collecting market data and providing analyses for the milk supply chain. 
Attempts to implement subsidies for those farmers who voluntarily reduce their 
production have been rejected by the EU Council in 2015 (EPRS 2015).  
Act against restraints of competition 
When analyzing imperfect competition, it is also important to understand how 
competition is protected in Germany. The act against restraints of competition 
(ARC) builds the legal framework. The ARC is enforced by the federal cartel 
office (FCO), an independent higher federal authority. The main task of the FCO is 
to keep competition on the markets and to prevent entities from gaining or 
strengthening power positions. Therefore, it monitors the compliance with the ban 
on cartels, controls mergers and abusive practices of dominant entities. 
Furthermore, the FCO has a public procurement tribunal to analyze award 
proceedings of public contracts by the Federation. (FCO 2015) 
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Regarding contractual relations between dairy farmers and processors, the final 
report of the sector inquiry on milk concludes that an abuse of a dominant position 
on the milk market could be found when dairy processors deter competition or 
entry of new firms on the market for raw milk due to long-term contract binding in 
addition to the delivery obligation of producers (section 106, FCO 2012). The 
abuse of a dominant position is prohibited according to § 19 GWB (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, act against restraints of competition). § 19 paragraph 
2 no. 4 GWB regulates that an abuse of a dominant position exists if “a dominant 
undertaking as a supplier or purchaser of certain kinds of goods or commercial 
services refuses to allow another undertaking access to its own networks or other 
infrastructure facilities against adequate consideration, provided that without such 
joint use the other undertaking is unable for legal or factual reasons to operate as a 
competitor of the dominant undertaking on the upstream or downstream market; 
this shall not apply if the dominant undertaking demonstrates that for operational or 
other reasons such joint use is impossible or cannot reasonably be expected”. 
Due to price drops below 20 ct. per litre in spring 2016, the latest policy 
discussions are dealing with how to coordinate supply and demand of raw milk and 
how to support dairy farmers. Farmers shall be supported financially and 
intervention stocks for milk products increased. The German farmer’s federation 
requires subsidies for those farmers who voluntarily reduce their production. Other 
suggestions are to improve communication between dairies and farmers about 
12   1.2 The German dairy sector: Policy and structure 
demanded raw milk quantities and sales opportunities of dairies. (ZEIT online 
2016a, ZEIT online 2016b) 
1.2.2 The structure of German dairy sector 
Data set 
For the analysis of the structure of the German dairy sector and the empirical 
estimations in chapter 3 and 4, a panel data set is used containing yearly 
information on the German milk market for the period 2001-2012.  
Regarding the farmers’ side, data on raw milk quantities and number of cows 
are available from EUROSTAT (EUROSTAT 2015), feed costs from the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN 2015) and the prices for young bulls from the 
Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI 2015). 
Annual information on dairies’ type of production (organic or conventional), 
processing quantity, legal form, postal address and raw milk prices is obtained 
from “Agrarmarktinformationsgesellschaft mbH” (AMI)1 (AMI 2014). The raw 
milk prices are for milk of grade one with 4.2% fat and 3.4% protein including 
additional payments, such as boni for large delivered quantities or loyalty, net of 
costs like quality assessment or storage costs so that the milk prices of the dairy 
processors in the data set are comparable. Additionally, a performance index is 
constructed by using the awards for the best products from the German magazine 
“Milch Marketing” (Milch Marketing (years 2001-2012)). The index is calculated 
                                                     
1 A German institution that collects data of agricultural entities. 
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as the sum of award points over the observed period and is used as a proxy for the 
quality of the output. Since dairy specific wholesale prices are unavailable, the 
national prices for skim and whole milk powder, whey powder, butter and cheese 
are used as an index for prices of processed dairy products (Milchtrends 2015). 
Data on wages in the dairy industry is gathered from the statistical offices of the 
federal states in Germany upon request. Missing data points are filled with the 
growth rate of wages in neighboring or structurally similar federal states or with 
the growth rate of wages in the food and fodder production industry in the 
respective states. Yearly national interest rates for corporates with a rate fixation up 
to 1 year are obtained from the European Central Bank (European Central Bank 
2015) and data on transportation costs are sourced from the Association of the 
German Petroleum Industry (Mineralölverband e.V. (2015) (see table 1.1 for an 
overview of the data used). 
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Table 1.1: Data used 
Data* Description level  source 
raw milk price €/kg average price for raw milk paid 
by dairies 
dairy specific AMI  
processed 
quantities 
kg of procured raw milk by dairies dairy specific AMI  
legal form dairy is organized as IOF or COOP dairy specific AMI  
production 
form 
organic or conventional production dairy specific AMI  
location of 
facility 
address of a dairy dairy specific AMI  
performance 
index 
sum of award points for innovative 
dairy products over the observed 
period 
dairy specific Milch 
Marketing 
wage €/h hourly wage for workers in the 
dairy industry 
federal state destatis 
produced raw 
milk quantities 
kg sum of raw milk quantities 
produced by dairy farmers in federal 
states 
federal state  EUROSTAT 
number of dairy 
cows 
sum of dairy cows in federal states federal state  EUROSTAT 
feed costs €/cow average feed costs per cow federal state  FADN 
transportation 
costs 
yearly average price per litre diesel 
fuel 
federal state Mineralöl-
verband e.V. 
output price €/kg price index containing the 
national average selling price for 
butter, cheese, skim milk, whole milk 
and whey powder 
Germany Milchtrends 
price for young 
bulls 
€/100 kg carcass weight Germany DG AGRI 
interest rate yearly national interest rate for 
corporates, rate fixation up to 1 year 
Germany European 
Central Bank 
*all data is on annual level.  
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Structure of the market 
The dairy processing industry is the biggest food sector in Germany responsible for 
a turnover of 26 billion Euro, and is one of the most important employers in the 
food sector providing more than 33,000 jobs in 2014 (MIV 2015). 
The German milk market has undergone a strong structural change in the last 
years. On dairy farmers’ side, raw milk production has increased in the years 
following the decision to abolish the milk quota accompanied by a decrease in 
number of dairy farms (EUROSTAT 2015). On dairy processors’ side, we observe 
a decrease in number of facilities (see figure 1.1) and an increase in average 
processing quantity (AMI 2014).  
Figure 1.1: Number of dairy facilities 
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The number of dairy facilities decreased from 197 in 2001 to 137 in 2012 (see 
figure 1.1). These 137 dairies divide into 107 conventional and 30 organic dairies.
 
The number of organic dairies more than doubled from 14 in 2001 to 30 in 2012 
with an increase in production of 60%. Regarding conventional dairies, total 
production only increased by 3% over the time span, but the average processing 
quantity increased by 40% from approximately 140.000 tons to 240.000 tons. 
In 2012, regarding the legal form of conventional dairies, 58% are organized 
as IOFs and 42% as COOPs. The average processing quantity (organic and 
conventional) in this year is higher in COOPs, due to the contribution of the 
“Deutsche Milchkontor” processing the overall largest quantity of approximately 
six million tons. In contrast, the maximum processed quantity of IOFs is one 
million tons by the “Molkerei Alois Müller GmbH & Co. KG”. In total, 27 Million 
tons of milk are processed in 2012, with 2% being organic and 98% being 
conventional production. 
To illustrate spatial dispersion of dairies and structural change, the map in 
Figure 1.2 represents the market structure in 2001 and 2012 and shows major milk 
processing and production areas in Germany. 
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Figure 1.2: Dairy processing facilities’ structural change 
2001
 
2012
 
 
 
The two maps show that milk processing has concentrated in the areas with high 
raw milk production. Bavaria and Lower Saxony account for 43% of total raw milk 
production quantity. It is expected that milk production will further shift from 
mountainous and disadvantaged areas to the North
2
 following the abolition of the 
                                                     
2 The South comprises the federal states Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg, the North the remaining 
federal states. 
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quota system (Gira 2012). Our dataset shows that structural change is stronger in 
the North. The market in the North is characterized by a few large dairies in 
contrast to the South with a high density of small dairies. From 2001 to 2012 the 
number of conventional dairy plants changed from 111 to 58, a decrease of 48% in 
the North. The structural change in the South was not as strong with the number of 
plants decreasing from 70 to 52, i.e. by 26%, in the same period. This change 
occurred at rather stable processing quantities overall. Consequently, the 
processing quantity per dairy increased by 104% in the North and 30% in the South 
leading to processors having an 89% larger average size in the North. Generally, 
the increase in average processing quantity is higher for COOPs (AMI 2014). 
Raw milk prices 
Raw milk prices fluctuated strongly in the last years. In 2001, the producer raw 
milk price peaked at 39.29 cents, likely influenced by low supply, high domestic 
demand and high world market prices. The prices subsequently fell until 2007, due 
to the bovine spongiforme enzephalopathie (BSE) crisis and low demand. As 
demand for milk products increased faster than supply, all inventories were 
consumed by 2007. Due to bad weather conditions, supply from Australia and 
South America was low, increasing world prices resulting in the price peak in 
2007. After 2007, the prices fell sharply and led to the milk price crisis in 2009 
fostered by the financial crisis. Since 2010, international demand increased and as 
the supply could not cover the increased demand, prices increased again. However, 
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this also increased production worldwide and thereby increased exports which led 
prices to drop again in 2012. (AMI 2011, Fahlbusch et al. 2009, 2011) 
Figure 1.3: Conventional raw milk price developments  
 
 
Figure 1.3 shows that raw milk prices are generally higher in the South comprising 
the federal states Bavaria (BY) and Baden-Wuerttemberg (BW). This may result 
from lower production costs in the North compared to the South (EMB 2013). 
Further, the performance index of the small structured dairy industry in the South is 
higher than the performance index of the rather large cooperative dairies in the 
North. 
Comparing the conventional raw milk prices of the federal states to the 
average raw milk price of 31.05 ct/kg over the data period, Rhineland Palatinate 
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(RP) shows the highest milk price (+1.09 ct/kg) followed by Bavaria (+0.85 ct/kg). 
The federal states with the lowest prices are Schleswig Holstein (SH) (-1.38 ct/kg) 
and Lower Saxony (LS) (-1.05 ct/kg) (see figure 1.4).  
Figure 1.4: Federal states’ raw milk price differences 
 
 
Several factors influence raw milk prices. They depend on the quality of milk and 
processor characteristics (high quality, innovative products vs. standard products 
like skimmed milk powder etc.) (FCO 2009). At the same time, it is assumed that 
the density of processors influences the raw milk prices as a high density of 
processors means more selling alternatives for farmers and thus more competition 
for raw milk. Addressing selling alternatives, Table 1.2 measures the concentration 
of dairies in the federal states as processing shares of the largest dairy (Conc.1) up 
to the three largest dairies (Conc.3) in the federal states.  
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Table 1.2: Concentration of dairies in terms of processing quantities in 2012 
state C1 C2 C3 
No. 
dairies 
Proc. quantity  
in Mio. tons 
avg. raw milk 
price 
in ct/kg 
HE 0.83 0.99 1 3 0.1439 0.3189 
SN 0.72 0.82 0.89 6 1.5270 0.3169 
BB 0.7 0.94 1 6 1.1164 0.3099 
LS 0.69 0.85 0.89 12 5.7000 0.3188 
RP 0.57 0.99 1 3 2.7928 0.3119 
TH 0.49 0.8 1 3 0.1527 0.3183 
MV 0.44 0.86 0.94 4 1.4131 0.3282 
SH 0.41 0.52 0.63 12 1.5459 0.3152 
BW 0.4 0.58 0.75 15 1.8533 0.3240 
ST 0.32 0.6 0.81 6 0.5397 0.3153 
NW 0.29 0.52 0.64 11 2.9113 0.3221 
BY 0.08 0.15 0.2 59 6.7631 0.3282 
With HE=Hesse, SN=Saxony, BB=Berlin and Brandenburg, LS=Lower Saxony, 
RP=Rhineland Palatinate, TH=Thuringia, MV= Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 
SH=Schleswig-Holstein, BW=Baden-Wuerttemberg, ST=Saxony-Anhalt, NW=North 
Rhine-Westphalia, BY= Bavaria 
 
Table 1.2 shows that selling alternatives are the highest in Bavaria, the state with 
the highest dairy density and an above average raw milk price (AMI 2014). 
Legal form of dairy processors 
When analyzing the milk market, the different legal forms of the dairies have to be 
considered because of their implications on firm behavior. A general problem of 
the entrepreneurial form of a COOP is the free rider problem and the short 
investment horizon. The free rider problem is supported by the law of a COOP. All 
members receive the same price and a COOP may not differentiate between its 
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members. Therefore, old members that have abstained from reimbursements in 
order to invest into the COOP get the same payment as new members that did not 
carry the risk of the investment from the beginning on. Hence, it is difficult to find 
members that are interested in long-term rather than short-term investments (Cook 
1995; Schramm et al. 2005; EMB 2012). Further, the different interests and 
heterogeneous risk levels of its members influence the investment decisions of a 
COOP which may influence producer prices negatively (Gerlach et al. 2006, BKA 
2009; Steffen et al. 2009). Regarding profit maximization of COOPs, the literature 
discusses different objective functions of COOPs and IOFs. Mainly total member 
welfare maximization is assumed for COOPs (Cotterill 1987; Sexton et al. 1990). 
But also net average revenue product (NARP) pricing is analyzed (Sexton 1990; 
Fousekis 2011a). Furthermore, it is discussed whether large COOPs just maximize 
firm profits in the same manner as IOFs do (maximizing net earnings) as single 
farmers cannot exert a significant influence on the decisions of large COOPs (EMB 
2012). 
1.3 Measuring market power 
To answer the research questions of the thesis, appropriate methodologies have 
been identified that measure market power in theoretical and empirical settings. 
Before these are explained in more detail (section 1.3.2), the following sub-section 
first defines the term market power from an economic perspective. 
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1.3.1  A definition of market power 
In economic theory, most often seller market power is analyzed where a firm’s 
price exceeds marginal cost (Motta 2004, p.41). Buyer market power, on the other 
hand, refers to the ability to set the price for an input below the competitive level. 
Nearly all firms have a certain margin when setting prices resulting for example 
from product quality and differentiation, cost efficiency and high fixed costs in the 
industry that provide a barrier for rivals to enter the market (Kaplow and Shapiro 
2007). Hence, prices that somewhat diverge from the competitive level are not 
necessarily evidence for market power. When investigating dominance of firms, 
the EC defines the relevant product and geographical market. The market share of 
the considered firm serves as the first indicator for dominance. A market share 
below 40% is assumed unlikely to be dominant. When competition authorities like 
the EC measure market power, they investigate whether a firm has abused its 
dominant position by increasing/decreasing prices over/below the competitive level 
for a significant period of time, distorting competition (EC 2013b). 
An oligopsony is characterized by a few large buyers facing a high number of 
smaller suppliers. In general, the price spread between input price and marginal 
product is essential for the measurement of buyer market power. If marginal 
revenue product equals the input supply function, the market is perfectly 
competitive (see figure 1.5). The most extreme form of an oligopsony is a 
monopsony, where only one purchaser of the good exists (Wildmann 2007). The 
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monopsonist maximizes its profit so that marginal revenue product (MRP) is equal 
to its marginal cost (MC). The input price is then determined on the input supply 
curve. The competitive price is higher than the monopsony price and results from 
supply equal to MRP (see figure 1.5). All combinations of prices and quantities 
lying between the competitive market and the monopsony solution with a price 
spread between input price and marginal product, are interpreted as oligopsonistic 
markets. 
Figure 1.5: Monopsony market 
 
Source: Own representation following Manning (2013). 
The analysis of buyer market power is central to assess imperfect competition on 
agricultural markets (Sexton, 2013; MacDonald et al., 2004). Agricultural food 
markets are often characterized by a low concentration of farmers and a high 
concentration of processors and retailers (Sexton, 2013; McCorriston, 2002, 
Rogers, 2001; Rogers and Sexton, 1994). Further, the input markets for agricultural 
raw products are usually local or regional resulting from high transportation costs 
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or high perishability of the products, especially for raw milk. Therefore, also the 
spatial aspects of the raw milk market and its effects on raw milk pricing are highly 
important when analyzing imperfect competition.  
1.3.2 Methodologies applied 
This chapter gives a short overview and literature categorization of the 
methodologies used to answer the research questions. They can be divided into a 
theoretical approach and two empirical approaches. Each methodology applied is 
described in more detail in the respective chapters. 
(I) Game theoretic modelling  
Building on the literature dealing with exclusive contracts (Aghion and 
Bolton 1987; Bork 1978; Rasmusen et al. 1991; Segal and Whinston 2000, 
Fumagalli and Motta 2006), a game theoretic model that incorporates the 
specific features of the raw milk market is used to answer research 
question (I). It is assumed that an incumbent dairy processor and a 
representative dairy farmer are active on the market. A rival dairy 
processor with lower marginal production costs wants to enter the market. 
Perfect competition is assumed for the downstream market for dairy 
products so that dairies compete only on the input market. Whether a 
contract is signed depends on the compensation the incumbent dairy is able 
to offer and the compensation the farmer demands. The demanded 
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compensation is depending on the profit the farmer obtains if the rival 
enters the market and the profit he gets if the incumbent deters rival’s 
entry. When the contract between the incumbent and the farmer is signed, 
it requires the farmer to deliver his whole production of milk. This type of 
an exclusive contract hinders the rival from entering the market, as there is 
no freely available milk. The approach calculates the compensation a dairy 
can offer and the compensation a farmer demands for two different model 
settings: In a basic model, the farmer is risk neutral and rival’s entry is 
certain. Then the model is expanded by incorporating farmer’s risk attitude 
and uncertainty of rival’s entry. The effects of exclusive contracts 
investigated analytically and numerically in both model settings to 
investigate when entry deterrence with exclusive contracts is possible. 
(II) Conjectural variation approach 
With the conjectural variation approach, market power is measured as the 
deviation from the competitive level, incorporating strategic interactions 
between firms (Bresnahan 1989; Appelbaum 1982; Lau 1982). Market 
power is usually estimated in a homogeneous good industry, where a 
conjectural variation parameter gives information on the degree of market 
power in the industry. This parameter measures the wedge between price 
and marginal product and is derived from the firm’s profit maximization 
problem.  
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For the analysis of buyer market power, the conjectural variation approach 
incorporates that the demand of a manufacturer influences the supply of the 
input good. This is modeled in the profit maximization procedure, resulting 
in a first order condition that also depends on the supply elasticity of the 
input good    and the conjectural variation parameter   .  
( , )
1
qf x I
w P
x


  
   
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, (1.1) 
where w is the price for the input x while ( , )qf x I represents the production 
function to produce output q with input x and other inputs I. The elasticity 
of supply is given by   x w w x     while ( , )qf x I x   reflects the 
marginal product.   i ix x x x     represents the conjectural variation 
parameter which measures the conjectural elasticity of firm i on the input 
market. It comprises how the available input quantity x  changes when 
firm i changes its quantity  ix x   and the firm’s market share  ix x . 
The wedge between price and marginal product is measured with the 
conjectural variation parameter and gives information on the degree of 
market power on the input market for raw milk (Bresnahan 1982; Hyde and 
Perloff 1998). If 0  , input price equals marginal product, pointing at a 
perfectly competitive market. 1   indicates a monopsony (or cartel 
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behavior) on the factor market. 0 1  suggests the existence of an 
oligopsonistic market structure. 
Due to scarce data availability, the specification of the conjectural variation 
approach developed by Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) is applied in the 
article presented in chapter 3. This specification needs fewer data 
requirements and uses a modification of a reduced-form value marginal 
product specification to represent the derivative of a generalized Leontief 
production function as follows: 
 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/20 1M M M L L K K Pw P x w w P

    

 
       
 
, (1.2) 
where the raw milk price of a dairy,
Mw , is estimated. Variables Lw  and 
Kw  are input prices for labor and capital, P is an index for dairy output 
prices and   represents the elasticity of raw milk supply. In order to 
account for dairy fixed effects, we reformulate equation (1.2) to construct 
nonlinear fixed effects panel estimation (see chapter 3.5).  
Ideally equation (1.2) and the raw milk supply function are estimated 
simultaneously in a three-stage least squares estimation. As this was 
however not feasible with the available data, a reduced form approach is 
used for the market power estimation to address endogeneity problems of 
raw milk prices and quantities. 
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(III) Spatial regression 
The theoretical literature on spatial pricing behavior finds the price-space 
relationship to be an inverted U-shape, a monotone negative or a monotone 
positive relationship. Which relation is found depends on the type of 
market actors (mixed or pure IOF or COOP markets), pricing (uniform 
delivered pricing (UD) where the dairy pays the shipping or free on board 
shipping (FOB) where the farmer pays the shipping), competition 
(Hotelling-Smithies (H-S) or Löschian Competition) and COOPs objective 
function and membership policy (net average revenue product pricing 
(NARP) or total member welfare maximization (TMW), open membership 
(OM) or restricted membership (RM)).  
Only few empirical studies analyze pricing behavior on milk markets in a 
spatial setting. Alvarez et al. (2000) focuses on the analysis of milk pricing 
of IOFs in the Asturias region in Spain while Huck et al. (2006) analyze 
COOP pricing in the German federal state Schleswig Holstein. Koller 
(2012) conducts an analysis for Germany without differentiating between 
dairies’ legal form. All three studies verify an inverted U-shaped relation of 
price and space that is theoretically derived by Alvarez et al.’s (2000). In 
an IOF market under the assumption of an unbounded line market, Alvarez 
et al. (2000) find that when space is relatively unimportant (i.e. firms are 
located close to each other or transportation cost are low) competition in 
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the backyard can occur where the market areas of a rival firm (B) extend 
beyond the firms’ location (A) (see figure 1.6). 
Figure 1.6: Illustration of competition in the backyard 
 
 
The assumptions of UD pricing and Löschian competition lead to the so-
called price matching behavior of dairies. Given UD pricing, shipping costs 
are paid by dairies and dairies increase their market area until profits are 
zero. Consequently, a price increase reduces the market area and the dairy 
loses farmers at the boundary. The assumption of price-matching behavior 
leads the rival’s price to increase as well resulting in a reduced market area 
of the rival losing farmers in the backyard of the considered firm which can 
then capture the abandoned farmers of its rival. Those are more profitable 
compared to the ones it loses at its market boundary, leading to higher 
profits under UD pricing. Therefore, given unimportance of space and thus 
competition in the backyard, prices are increasing in space. If space gets 
more important (due to higher transportation costs or a higher distance to 
1.3 Measuring market power   31 
 
 
 
neighboring dairies), prices decrease in space leading to the inverted U-
shaped function (see figure 1.7). 
Figure 1.7: Inverted U-shaped relation of price and space 
 
Source: Own illustration derived from Alvarez et al. (2000). 
In the decreasing part of the function in figure 1.7 competition takes place 
only between the firms’ locations. The inverse relationship between 
transportation costs and market area between firms leads to this negative 
relation between price and space and may result in separated 
monopsonistic markets (Alvarez et al. 2000). Such a negative relation is 
also found in other theoretical studies (see Sexton 1990; Zhang and Sexton 
2001; Tribl 2012; Fousekis 2011a and 2011b).  
In contrast to former empirical studies on spatial pricing, chapter 4 
provides a spatial regression analysis that differentiates between the effects 
of space on the pricing of IOF and COOP dairies while incorporating 
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characteristics (such as legal and production form) of neighboring 
competitors. Results allow to relate the shape of the relationship between 
price and space to the theoretically derived relations provided in the 
literature (Sexton 1990; Rogers and Sexton 1994; Alvarez et al. 2000; 
Zhang and Sexton 2001; Fousekis 2011a and b; Tribl 2012). Therefore, a 
spatially lagged explanatory variable model (SLX) of the general form 
y X WX      is estimated with y being a vector of the dependent 
variable, X a matrix of explanatory variables, W a row standardized spatial 
weighting matrix,   and   coefficients to be estimated and 
 20,N I   with I being an identity matrix. In addition, the competitive 
yardstick effect is verified with the regression results.  
1.4 Summary of main findings and conclusion  
For each of the articles forming chapters 2-4, the main findings are summarized in 
this section. Afterwards conclusions and limitations are presented. 
1.4.1 Summary of main findings 
(I) Entry deterring effects of contractual relations in the dairy processing 
sector 
Concerning research question (I) the game theoretic model shows that the 
entry of a rival dairy processor into the market can be deterred under 
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certain assumptions on farmer’s risk aversion and rival’s probability of 
entry. 
The basic scenario assuming a risk neutral farmer and certainty of rival’s 
entry shows that the incumbent dairy cannot offer a suitable compensation 
for the farmer to accept the contract. This changes when introducing risk 
attitude and probability of a rival’s entry. The analytical analysis reveals 
the following relation between entry probability k and farmers’ risk 
attitude r specifying farmers’ utility function 
ru  . 
Figure 1.8: Effective entry deterrence depending on k and r 
 
34   1.4 Summary of main findings and conclusion 
Entry can be deterred for all combinations of r and k that lie on and 
underneath the curve in figure 1.8. In this case, the compensation the 
incumbent dairy can offer is higher than the one the farmer requires.  
In terms of profits, the farmer is better off in case of the rival’s market 
entry. However, due to risk aversion he is willing to accept the 
compensation the incumbent dairy offers and accepts the contract. Due to 
higher profits in a monopsonistic market, the incumbent dairy has the 
incentive to deter a rival’s entry in all analyzed scenarios.  
The model shows that entry deterrence depends on the entry probability of 
the rival and farmers’ risk attitude. Regarding the concerns of the German 
sector inquiry about the abuse of a dominant position with long-term 
contracts, the study emphasizes the importance of the flexibility of farmers 
to change processor. 
(II) Conjectural variations on the German raw milk market – An empirical 
investigation of oligopsony power  
The market power estimation to answer research question (II) finds 
evidence of an oligopsonistic market structure in six out of twelve analyzed 
federal states and also on the national level. Even though most of the 
conduct parameter values are close to zero, indicating to a small impact of 
a single dairy’s input demand change on the whole dairy industry input, the 
price distortions resulting from market power range between 1% and 14%. 
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No significant evidence for market power is found in four federal states 
suggesting a competitive market.  
Regarding the correlation between market power and concentration of 
dairy processors, the study provides low correlation coefficients. Here, 
concentration is measured relative to processing quantities as data to 
calculate the Herfindahl Hirschmann Index was not available. However, 
the market power parameter estimates have to be regarded with caution. 
The estimation of the market power parameters crucially depends on the 
estimate of the raw milk supply elasticity whose underlying parameters 
were not statistically significant.  
(III) Pricing behavior of cooperatives and investor-owned dairies in a spatial 
market setting 
With regard to research question (III) addressing the influence of space on 
raw milk prices, opposite effects for North and South Germany are found 
that are only significant for COOPs (see figure 1.9). 
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Figure 1.9: Relation between price and space of COOPs and IOFs in the 
North and the South 
 
Note: For 2012. All other variables are at means. 
In contrast to other empirical studies (Alvarez et al. 2000; Huck et al. 2012 
and Koller 2012) the results do not show an inverted U-shaped relation 
between price and space.  
The negative relation in the South can be explained by competition 
between the dairies’ locations. If dairies are responsible for the 
transportation costs (uniform delivered (UD) pricing), increasing space is 
equivalent to increasing transportation cost. Hence, market areas are 
decreasing when transportation cost are too high, resulting in less 
competition between firms with more separated markets and corresponding 
room for monopsonistic pricing.  
The positive relation between price and space in the North can be 
explained with the theory of UD pricing, price matching behavior (where a 
firm expects its rival to react in the exact same way) and competition in the 
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backyard (competition that reaches behind the firms’ locations (Alvarez et 
al. 2000). If space is relatively unimportant and assuming price matching, a 
dairy that increases its price expects its rival to also increase its price. The 
higher prices lead to a reduction in the market area (due to the need to 
cover transportation cost) so that dairies gain farmers in their own 
backyard. 
The spatial pricing literature does not provide explanations for the finding 
that space does not significantly affect the pricing of IOFs. A possible 
explanation could be the membership policy of a COOP. Under open 
membership as currently practiced by German COOPs (FCO 2009), 
COOPs cannot reject farmers that want to participate. Hence, COOPs 
cannot efficiently choose their market area but have to consider the whole 
market as their area of operation.  
Finally, the study does not find clear evidence for the competitive yardstick 
effect. In the South, an increase in the share of neighboring COOPs 
increases prices whereas the exact opposite effect occurs in the North. As 
COOPs in the North pay a significant lower price than IOFs this is not a 
surprising result. However, even though significant, the effects are rather 
small from an economic perspective in both the North and the South.  
Regarding the concerns about the positive relation of concentration and 
market power, the study suggests that a further concentration of the milk 
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processing sector does not necessarily lead to an increase in market power 
and a decrease in prices. 
1.4.2 Conclusion and limitations  
Regarding the overall objective of this thesis, to investigate imperfect competition 
on the German raw milk market, the findings of this thesis have to be divided into 
the theoretical and the two empirical analyses.  
The theoretical analysis of entry deterring effects of exclusive contracts has 
elaborated on research question (I), showing that under certain conditions of 
farmer’s risk aversion and rival’s entry probability, exclusive contracts lead to 
market foreclosure. The challenges of the theoretical approach involved the 
abstraction of the market while still depicting the most important characteristics of 
the market. However, regarding the concerns about market foreclosing effects of 
long-term contracts between farmers and dairies, the study emphasizes that 
exclusive contracts may serve as a market entry barrier. Hence, flexibility of 
farmers to change processor contributes to a competitive market. 
The market power estimation of the dairy industry in the federal states 
(research question II) confirms an oligopsonistic market structure for six federal 
states and also on the national level. For four federal states the null hypothesis of 
perfect competition is not rejected. The spatial competition analysis (research 
question III) has shown different pricing behaviors of COOPs and IOFs in the 
North and South of Germany, which are only significant for COOPs. In the South, 
prices are decreasing in space indicating the existence of market power. With 
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respect to the low concentration of the dairy industry in the South, this result was, 
however, not expected. Referring to the results of the market power estimation, this 
result is in line with the finding of an oligopsonistic market structure in Bavaria. 
However, for Baden-Wuerttemberg the market power estimation suggests a 
perfectly competitive market. For the North, the relation between price and space is 
positive. Hence, an increasing concentration of the dairy industry and thereby the 
increasing space between dairies’ location does not necessarily result in market 
power and decreasing prices. Reasons for a competitive raw milk market can be the 
high share of cooperatives, the bargaining power from producer organizations or 
market power at another stage of the supply chain, which restricts dairies to use 
market power even in a concentrated market. These findings are in line with the 
significantly negative conduct parameters that are found for Schleswig-Holstein 
and Saxony-Anhalt. However, for other federal states of the North, the market 
power estimation provides evidence for an oligopsonistic structure, like Lower 
Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony and Thuringia. 
With respect to ongoing discussions about low raw milk prices, imperfect 
competition and concentration of the dairy industry, the findings from the empirical 
studies suggest that the cause for low raw milk prices might result from dairy 
processors buyer market power which leads to price distortions between 1% and 
14%. Furthermore, market power at another stage of the supply chain might also be 
a cause for low raw milk prices that are not only prevalent in federal states where 
market power was found with the conjectural variation approach. Also, the low 
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world market demand, the Russian embargo and the high raw milk production after 
the quota abolition in Germany are certainly factors decreasing raw milk prices. 
Regarding policy discussions about the prospects of the milk market, the causes for 
low milk prices have to be investigated more closely. If market power is not the 
cause for low raw milk prices, the large supply of raw milk in combination with 
weak demand conditions for milk products is certainly a strong factor.  
Regarding future research, especially the market power estimation of the dairy 
industry could be improved on the data side. Detailed information on the output 
performance of a dairy, i.e. data on prices and quantities for specific product 
categories, will contribute to get a better picture of the market behaviour. Further, 
precise data on the market area of dairies, where they collect milk and who their 
competitors are, would be beneficial for spatial analyses which are highly relevant 
for geographically limited markets as the raw milk market. With such data also 
concentration indices could be calculated more precisely. This would contribute to 
the analysis of correlation between concentration and buyer market power of 
dairies to get insights on the effects of a further concentration of the milk market. 
Regarding the future of the raw milk market, the question is whether a new market 
regulation after the quota abolition solves the problem of low prices at the expenses 
of competitiveness, postponing structural change and the associated economies of 
scales. 
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Abstract 
The European Commission has launched the so-called “milk package” in October 
2012 that allows Member States to require compulsory written contracts between 
milk producers and investor-owned processors. We argue that compulsory contracts 
have anticompetitive effects when they are exclusive in the sense that they comprise 
the obligation to supply to the contractor only. The objective of this paper is to set up 
a game theoretic model to analyze imperfect competition on the raw milk market that 
may result from entry deterring effects of exclusive contracts between dairy 
producers and processors. Building on the antitrust literature, the model incorporates 
the specific characteristics of the milk market and considers the risk attitude of milk 
producers and uncertainty of a rival dairy’s market entry. Under certain combinations 
of probability of the rival's market entry and risk aversion of the producer, an 
incumbent can deter market entry by offering an exclusive contract. 
Keywords: entry deterrence, imperfect competition, buyer power, 
exclusive contracts, dairy processing 
JEL classification: L13, L14, L41Formelabschnitt (nächster) 
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2.1 Introduction 
In the EU-27, milk is one of the most important agricultural goods, representing 
about 13% of the total turnover of the European food and beverage industry (EDA 
2013). In the past years, structural changes on both producer and processor side, 
innovations in milk production and the decision of the EU Commission to abolish 
the quota regime changed the milk market. The increasing concentration of dairy 
processing
3
 facilities raise concerns regarding buyer market power of dairy 
processors (BKA 2009; BKA 2012). Addressing producers’ position on the market, 
the European Commission launched the so-called “milk package” in October 2012 
which aims at strengthening producers’ market position by improving their 
bargaining power and the transparency of the market. The “milk package” sets 
criteria for the formation of producer organizations and specifies rules for the 
regulation of PDO/PGI cheese supply. Further, it allows Member States to imply 
compulsory written contracts between milk producers and investor-owned 
processors. Due to their specific ownership structure, cooperatives are exempted 
from this policy. As contracts used in recent years were often not well specified, 
the recommendation is that contractual agreements should not only become 
compulsory but also contain a minimum standard of specified criteria (e.g. details 
on price, volume and duration of contract). Currently, 12 Member States have 
introduced compulsory contracts (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Hungary, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) with minimum 
                                                     
3 Own calculation based on data from the Agrarmarkt Informationsstelle (AMI) (2014), a German 
institution that collects data of agricultural entities. 
2.1 Introduction   49 
 
 
 
contract durations of 6 months in most states, 1 year in Spain and even 5 years in 
France. Other Member States have not introduced compulsory contracts but agreed 
on codes of good practice between producers and processors (Belgium, United 
Kingdom). In Germany, contracts between farmers and investor-owned dairies are 
usually negotiated by producer organizations. These contracts usually contain 
details on quality, price parameters and specify the length of the contracts. In 
addition to these criteria, contracts shall be more precise about the contracted milk 
volume in the future. (EC 2014)  
In the sector inquiry of the German milk market the question arose how long-
term contracts in combination with the obligation to supply the whole production 
quantity to processors affect competition (FCO 2012). The concern is that by tying 
up milk producers through long-term contracts without appropriate cancellation 
periods, strong or dominant processors may use their market power to deter 
competition or entry to the market for raw milk. Combined with the producer’s 
obligation to supply the full production quantity, this could lead to an abuse of a 
dominant position, which is prohibited by law (article 102 of the treaty for the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) (FCO 2012, section 106). According 
to the sector inquiry, 45% of the contracts between private dairies and milk 
producers have durations longer than two years. Furthermore, 85 % of German 
producers delivering milk to private dairy processing facilities are obliged to 
supply their entire production and the processing facility is likewise obliged to 
accept the whole amount (FCO 2009). In 2012, 60% of milk is processed in 
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cooperatives mainly due to the largest dairy cooperative in Germany, the 
“Deutsche Milchkontor”. In terms of number of processing facilities, only 
approximately 40% of the 137 active processing facilities in 2012 were 
cooperatives, the remaining ones are investor owned firms (AMI 2014).
4
  
The frequent use of contracts on the milk market may be explained by their 
ability to reduce price risks and to secure delivery quantities for dairy producers 
and input quantities for processors. However, they may also empower processors to 
exercise buyer market power by binding dairy producers and reducing delivery 
flexibility, which may even lead to entry deterrence of other dairy processors. We 
argue that compulsory contracts have anticompetitive effects as they are exclusive 
given the obligation to deliver to the contractor only. This is usually the case 
between milk producer and processor (FCO 2009) and holds likewise for investor-
owned and cooperative dairies.  
Anticompetitive effects of exclusive contracts have been scarcely studied 
under the specific characteristics of agricultural markets (exception e.g.: Xia and 
Sexton 2004 for the U.S. cattle industry), and only in the context of the antitrust 
literature focusing on seller market power (e.g. Segal and Whinston 2000; 
Rasmusen et al. 1991; Aghion and Bolton 1978). The analysis of seller market 
power is however of limited relevance on agricultural markets. Although they are 
                                                     
4 Concerning the EU, the importance of investor-owned companies is even more pronounced: Among 
the top ten of Europe’s largest dairy processors in terms of turnover, six firms are organized as 
investor-owned dairies and four as cooperatives. Among the top three only investor-owned dairies can 
be found (Nestlé, Danone, Lactalis) (MIV 2012). Even though investor-owned dairies process only 
about 36% of European raw milk, this highlights the importance of investor-owned firms in the 
European dairy market. 
2.1 Introduction   51 
 
 
 
often assumed to be perfectly competitive, the structure of agricultural markets is 
more precisely characterized by a low concentration of producers and a high 
concentration of processors and retailers (Sexton 2013; McCorriston 2002; Rogers 
2001; Rogers and Sexton 1994). Therefore, the analysis of buyer market power is 
central (Sexton 2013; MacDonald et al. 2004). However, oligopsony competition 
or monopsony behavior in an input market are rarely treated in the agricultural 
economic literature (exceptions are Sexton 2013; Mérel 2011; Crespi et al. 2012; 
Sexton 2013; Graubner et al. 2011; Alvarez et al. 2000).  
Given the high adoption rate of compulsory contracts and in light of the 
concern of the German sector inquiry about resulting anticompetitive effects on the 
milk market, the aim of this paper is to analyze if exclusive contracts between dairy 
processor and producer restrict competition on the raw milk market
5
. This paper 
goes beyond the existing literature (1) providing a game theoretic analysis of the 
competitive effects of exclusive contractual relations based on the antitrust 
literature but in the framework of a monopsonistic market structure and (2) 
motivating the signing of an exclusive contract with the uncertainty of rival’s entry 
and risk aversion of the signer - in contrast to former models of exclusive contracts. 
                                                     
5 Germany, as the largest milk producer in Europe, stays in the focus of our analysis, motivated by the 
sector inquiry of the German milk market conducted by the German national competition authority 
(BKA 2012). However, the analysis may also be relevant for other Member States with a similar 
market structure. 
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Competitive effects of exclusive contracts are modelled between an incumbent 
investor-owned dairy processor on the milk market and one representative raw 
milk producer. We assume that a rival (investor-owned) dairy processor with lower 
marginal production costs threatens to enter the market. A short-term equilibrium 
in which the incumbent dairy offers an exclusive contract to the producer in order 
to deter the rival dairy’s market entry is analyzed. After the producer decided 
whether to accept the contract with the incumbent, the rival decides upon entry. By 
incorporating uncertainty of rival’s entry and producer’s risk attitude, we show that 
exclusive contracts can indeed be used to deter entry of a rival processor into a 
downstream market when the upstream producer is risk averse. Most raw milk 
producers nowadays are highly specialized farms where the main income source 
results from milk production (EU Commission 2014). Not a lot is known about the 
real “level” of risk aversion among dairy producers, but some evidence exists that 
dairy farmers are generally risk averse (Loughrey et al. 2014; Melhim and 
Shumway 2011). This may lead farmers to sign exclusive contracts with a dairy to 
reduce the income risk related to their main production activity. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section gives an overview on the 
relevant literature. Section 2.3 presents the game theoretic model. In a baseline 
model, an exclusive contract between dairy producer and processor is analyzed 
without incorporating uncertainty about the rival’s entry and producer’s risk 
attitude, resulting in failure to deter entry. In a next step, we show how the 
inclusion of risk attitude and uncertainty may allow to deter rival’s entry. 
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Subsequently, a numerical example underlines the theoretical results. Section 2.4 
discusses the model while section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Literature review 
The analysis of contractual relations in the dairy processing sector requires the 
consideration of the contract design and the competitive effects. Empirical studies 
find that producers strongly favor a redesign of raw milk contracts in terms of 
contract length and cancellation periods (Steffen et al. 2009; Schlecht et al. 2013). 
Further, releasing producers of their supply obligation and allowing them to sell to 
more than one dairy processor is seen as an improvement in terms of both 
producers’ flexibility and bargaining position (Steffen et al. 2009; Schlecht et al. 
2013; FCO 2012; Schaper et al. 2008).  
Concerning the competitive effects of contracts, entry deterring effects of 
exclusive contracts are analyzed in the antitrust literature focusing on seller market 
power (e.g. Aghion and Bolton 1987; Bork 1978; Rasmusen et al. 1991; Segal and 
Whinston 2000). Roger and Sexton (1994) and Sexton (2013) emphasize the 
importance of oligopsony power in agricultural markets. However, there is little 
work on exclusionary effects of contracts in the context of the specific 
oligopsonistic structure between agricultural producers and food processors. 
MacDonald et al. (2004) and Vavra (2009) analyze the use of contracts in 
agricultural markets and discuss the possibility to deter entry of buyers into local 
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markets. To our knowledge, none of the existing studies explicitly models risk 
behavior of producers and its effects on entry deterrence of exclusive contracts 
(although Innes and Sexton (1994) discuss at least the implication).  
The models used in the antitrust literature for the analysis of seller market 
power are usually designed in the following way: An incumbent seller contracts a 
buyer who is usually a consumer with an exclusive supply contract. The contract 
specifies a compensation for the buyer to accept the contract and to not purchase 
from the incumbent’s rival, which leads to entry deterrence in the upstream market. 
The “Chicago School” view (Director and Levi 1956; Posner 1976; Bork 1978) 
criticizes the entry deterring effects of contracts and argues that an incumbent 
confronted with buyers preferring entry of a rival due to increased competition and 
potentially better prices, would have to pay more for the rival’s exclusion than to 
be gained from it. The reason is that the incumbent has to compensate buyers for 
the additional consumer surplus they would have gained in case of entry, which 
they lose by signing the contract. It has been shown that entry deterrence is not 
profitable in this case as the lost consumer surplus is higher than the monopoly 
profit in case of entry deterrence. Therefore, the Chicago School explained the 
observable use of exclusive contracts with efficiency reasons rather than 
anticompetitive behavior (Director and Levi 1956; Posner 1976; Bork 1978).  
Since the 1980s, economists have developed game theoretic models that 
analyze anticompetitive effects of exclusive contracts. Aghion and Bolton (1987) 
developed a model where exclusive contracts are used to extract some of the 
surplus a potential rival would gain in case of market entry. They analyze the 
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optimal contract length and differentiate between symmetric and asymmetric 
information about the probability of the rival’s entry and their impacts on entry 
deterrence. Furthermore, the entrant endures fixed costs for entry. They find that 
entry deterrence leads to a lower economic welfare. Later, Rasmusen et al. (1991) 
used buyer’s lack of information to explain the existence of exclusive contracts and 
their entry deterring effects. If a buyer expects other buyers to sign an exclusive 
contract, he will also sign the contract without considering the overall economic 
effect, which leads to entry deterrence and a lower welfare. Segal and Whinston 
(2000) reconsidered Rasmusen et al.’s (1991) model and showed that market entry 
is profitable when the rival can sell his product to a minimum number of buyers to 
cover fixed costs. If buyers sign exclusive contracts, it is difficult for the entrant to 
get the minimum scale needed and thus entry is deterred. Segal and Whinston 
(2000) show that when the incumbent makes discriminatory offers to the buyers, 
the externalities present between buyers lead to a profitable exclusion of rivals. 
These analyses explain the signing of exclusive contracts with market 
disorganization (Rasmusen et al. 1991; Segal and Whinston 2000) or complex 
contract terms (Aghion and Bolton 1978), even though the signer would be better 
off without contracts.  
Fumagalli and Motta (2006) point out that the above mentioned models 
assume that buyers are final consumers whereas typically exclusive agreements are 
rather signed amongst producers or producers and processors or wholesalers. They 
consider the case where buyers procure a good from an upstream firm that is either 
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from an incumbent producer or a rival producer and then sell it in a final market. In 
the case of buyers being final consumers, the demand and the payoff of a buyer 
depend only on the price of the good. But when buyers compete in a downstream 
market, their market share, the input price and the rival buyer’s price are relevant 
for demand and affects the possibility of entry deterrence.  
In recent years, a separate strand of literature emerged where raw milk pricing 
behavior and the implications for competition are analyzed in a spatial market 
setting (Alvarez et al. 2000; Huck et al. 2006; Graubner et al. 2011). In our 
analysis, the spatial dimension is not explicitly considered. 
2.3 The Model 
On the upstream market one representative
6
 dairy producer takes the price for raw 
milk w as given. The (inverse) supply function for raw milk is defined as an 
inelastic function with 2w x , defined for 0x  , implying that the producer is 
able to extend production at increasing marginal cost in the short to medium term. 
Dairies accept the entire production quantity x of the producer and cannot 
choose the quantity they would like to procure. Therefore, we assume that 
processors compete in prices for raw milk à la Bertrand. On the intermediate stage 
of the market, an incumbent dairy (dairy A) is procuring the milk quantity
Ax  from 
the representative milk producer (producer P). A rival dairy (dairy B) with lower 
                                                     
6 We do not consider a specific number of dairy producers and as we assume that producers take the 
price for raw milk is given, we just speak about a producer in the following. 
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marginal production costs than the incumbent, 
B Ac c , threatens to enter the 
market. To enter the market, the rival dairy has to consider fixed costs F. We 
assume that F is too large for the entrant to offer a compensation for signing an 
exclusive contract.
7
 We abstain from incorporating spatial characteristics of the 
market and assume that the raw milk price offered to the producer is independent 
of the transport costs or distance between producer and processor. Regarding the 
final dairy product q, we assume a processing relation of x q  for both dairies.  
If dairy B entered, both processors would be competitors on the market for 
raw milk and compete in milk prices. Due to Bertrand price competition, the 
producer delivers milk to the highest bidder. In order to deter rival dairy B’s entry, 
the incumbent dairy A can offer an exclusive contract to the producer. The 
exclusive contract comprises a compensation 
A  for selling all the produced milk 
to the incumbent and not to the rival. In case of a signed contract, the fact that the 
whole amount of raw milk is delivered to the incumbent dairy deters entry as the 
potential entrant can only procure milk from a free producer. If entry is 
successfully deterred, monopsony prices and profits are realized. 
The marketing of the final dairy product is not restricted to a regional market 
but can be sold on the national or even on the world market, which allows the 
                                                     
7 It would become more difficult for the incumbent to deter a rival’s entry if we would remove the 
assumption that rival’s fixed costs of entry are too high to also offer a compensation for an exclusive 
contract. However, the assumption is justified as the entry into a new market involves high entry 
costs. 
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assumption of a competitive downstream market. Hence, dairies take the output 
price p as given. 
A short-term equilibrium in which the incumbent dairy offers an exclusive 
contract to the producer in order to deter the rival dairy’s market entry is analyzed. 
The timing of the game is as follows: At stage one, the incumbent dairy A can offer 
an exclusive contract that specifies a compensation and an exclusive delivery 
obligation for the producer for the whole production amount. The producer decides 
whether to accept the contract. At stage two, the rival dairy B decides upon entry. 
At stage 3, active processors set prices.  
First of all, a basic model demonstrates the effects of exclusive contracts in a 
framework with a risk neutral producer and certainty of rival’s entry in absence of 
an exclusive contract. Then, these restrictions are relaxed and producer’s risk 
attitude and uncertainty of rival’s entry are incorporated in the model. 
2.3.1  The basic model 
In order to discuss the implications of exclusive contracts we analyze two 
scenarios. In scenario 1, a basic monopsony model structure without contracts is 
constructed. Here, only dairy A and the producer are active on the market. 
Scenario 2 analyzes market entry of dairy B.  
Let us assume that 1ic  , ic p  and isw p , where subindices ,i A B  
represent the market actor and 1,2s   the scenario. In scenario 1, the monopsony 
scenario, dairy A maximizes its profit over the price for raw milk offered to the 
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producer. The raw milk price that maximizes dairy A’s profit is given by 
1Aw  and 
leads to a profit of 
1A . The corresponding profit for the producer is denoted by 
1P  (see table 2.1). 
In scenario 2, the case of dairy B’s market entry, dairies compete à la 
Bertrand. The highest price dairy B can offer is B Bw p c  , whereas dairy A’s 
highest price is A Aw p c  . Since B Ac c , processor B is able to offer a higher 
price for raw milk, 2 2B Aw w . In case of market entry, dairy B will offer a slightly 
higher price than dairy A, 
2B Aw p c     with 0  .
8
 Consequently, the 
producer will sell to the rival and dairy A will lose its market share resulting in a 
positive profit 
2B  for dairy B and a zero profit for dairy A (see table 2.1). In this 
setup, there exists no equilibrium in which both dairies are active on the market. 
However, we assume that dairy A will not exit the market but is still present in the 
region with its production facility. In this case, dairy B’s market entry will not 
result in another monopsony situation, as dairy B has to keep its pricing strategy to 
prevent dairy A from re-entering the market. 
                                                     
8 If A Bw w , the producer will not split its milk quantity between the two dairies but will sell the 
entire production to dairy B. 
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Table 2.1: Comparison of scenario 1 and 2 
 Sc. 
Price for raw 
milk 
Raw milk quantity Profit 
Dairy A 
1 1
3
A
A
p c
w

  
1/2
1 ( )
3
A
A
p c
x

  
3/2
1
2
( )
3 3
A Ap c    
2 2A Aw p c   2 0Ax   2
0A   
Dairy B 
1 1 0Bw   1 0Bx   1
0B   
2 2B Aw p c     
1/2
2 ( )B Ax p c     
1/2
2 ( )( )B A B Ac c p c F         
Producer 
1 1
3
A
A
p c
w

  
1/2
1 ( )
3
A
A
p c
x

  
3/2
1
2
( )
9 3
P Ap c    
2 2B Aw p c     
1/2
2 ( )B Ax p c     
3/2
2
2
( )
3
P Ap c     
 
The comparison of the two scenarios demonstrates the incentive for dairy A to 
deter dairy B’s market entry. In case of market entry, dairy A achieves a zero 
profit, whereas the profit in the monopsony case, 
1A , is positive. The producer, on 
the other hand, is better off in case of dairy B’s market entry as 
2 1P P  . 
Without taking producer’s risk aversion and uncertainty of rival’s entry into 
account, the compensation that dairy A needs to offer to the producer for an 
exclusive contract must compensate for the producer’s surplus lost when accepting 
the contract. This is the difference between the profits in the two scenarios, 
2 1P P P    , which is equal to 
3/2 3/22 2( ) ( )
3 9 3
P A Ap c p c      . (2.1) 
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The maximum compensation dairy A is willing to offer is 
1 2A A A     which 
leads to 
3/22 ( )
3 3
A Ap c   . (2.2) 
Comparing (2.1) with (2.2) we observe that the compensation the producer requires 
is higher than the one dairy A is able to offer, i.e. 
P A  . Therefore, offering an 
exclusive contract is not beneficial for dairy A in this setup. Consequently, if a 
lower cost producing dairy B enters the market, dairy A is not able to keep its raw 
milk source, as the compensation dairy A is able to offer does not offset the higher 
price dairy B is able to pay.  
2.3.2 Risk attitude and uncertainty of entry 
In order to incorporate producer’s risk attitude, producer’s utility function is 
defined as 
r
pu  , where the exponent r determines the risk attitude of the 
producer. If 1r  , the utility function implies a risk loving producer, if 1r   risk 
neutrality and if 0 1r   absolute risk aversion.  
Exogenous determinants lead dairy B to enter the market. Depending on dairy 
A’s assumptions on the probability of dairy B’s market entry, dairy A offers an 
exclusive contract to the milk producer. The probability of entry is denoted by k  
such that 1 k  is the probability of no entry, both for the case of no contract. If 
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successful, the signing of the exclusive contract deters entry of dairy B and thus, 
probability of entry is zero. 
Whether the offering of an exclusive contract leads to entry deterrence 
depends on the compensation that dairy A can pay, which depends on the entry 
probability of the rival and producer’s risk attitude. Is the compensation high 
enough for the producer to accept, the contract will be signed and entry of the rival 
is deterred. The market is in a monopsony situation with prices and quantities being 
as in scenario 1 of the basic model. If the contract with dairy A is not accepted, the 
producer will sell the entire production quantity to dairy B. The compensation the 
producer requires for signing a contract with dairy A depends on the payoff 
required for not staying free on the market. This payoff is equal to the certainty 
equivalent ( )PCE  and the payoff under contract  1P . Therefore, the 
compensation that leads to an exclusive contract has to be equal to the difference 
between the certainty equivalent and the profit in the monopsony situation, 
1
risk
P P PCE   , which is equal to 
    
1/
1 2 11
r
r rrisk
P P P Pk k        
. (2.3) 
The highest compensation that dairy A is able to offer under uncertainty is equal to  
 1 2 1(1 )
risk
A A A Ak k       .  (2.4) 
For simplicity we define the margin of dairy A as 
Ap c m   and assume that 
0  . Then, inserting the findings from table 2.1 yields 
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1/
3/2 3/2 3/22 2 2( , , ) (1 )
3 9 3 9 3
r
rr
risk
P r m k m k m m 
   
       
     
 (2.5) 
3/22
3 3
risk
A k m
 
  
 
. (2.6) 
Rival’s entry can be deterred if risk risk
P A   ((2.5) (2.6)). Hence, dairy A can offer 
a compensation that induces the producer to sign the contract and thus deters entry 
if 0risk riskA P   .  
To better understand under which conditions this is valid, rearranging leads to 
3 /2 2 2 2 2(1 ) 0
33 3 9 3 9 3
r rr
rm k k k
     
         
      
.  (2.7) 
Whether this inequality holds depends on the values of k, r and m. The margin 
Am p c   is by definition positive. Therefore, entry can only be deterred if the 
term in brackets in equation (2.7) is larger than zero, which depends on the 
variables k and r.  
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Figure 2.1: Effective entry deterrence depending on k and r 
 
Figure 2.1 shows levels of k and r that lead to a positive term in equation (2.7) 
i.e. a situation where entry deterrence is possible. This is valid for all combinations 
of k and r that lie on the curve and underneath the curve in figure 2.1. A highly risk 
averse producer would even accept the contract when the entry probability is high, 
enabling dairy A to maintain the monopsony situation on the market. If, on the 
other hand, the entry probability is relatively high and risk aversion only moderate 
dairy A has no possibility to deter entry. 
Contrary to the basic model, it is now possible to deter rival’s entry for certain 
levels of producer’s risk aversion and the probability of rival’s entry. If the market 
entry is deterred, the market is in a monopsony situation, resulting in prices and 
profits of the basic scenario 1 and providing the incentive for dairy A to sign an 
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exclusive contract with the producer. If deterrence is possible, then the level of 
compensation dairy A has to pay to maintain the monopsony position increases 
with the probability of market entry by dairy B and decreases with the increasing 
risk aversion of the farmer.  
2.3.3 Numerical example 
Using a numerical example roughly reflecting the current situation on the German 
dairy market, we assume that the marginal costs of the rival are 0.18Bc  ct/kg and 
the marginal costs of the incumbent are 20 % higher, 0.22Ac  ct/kg. The 
downstream price p for one unit of a (not further specified) dairy product is 
assumed to be 0.48p  ct/kg
9
.  
Basic model 
Based on these numbers, the price that dairy A offers in Scenario 1 of the basic 
model is equal to 9 ct/kg (see table 2.2). This is a rather low price for raw milk, 
which results from our crude assumptions and the monopsonistic market structure.  
                                                     
9 Data derived from a cost figure provided by the German dairy association (MIV 2011). 
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Table 2.2: Numerical example of the basic model 
 
Sc. Price for raw milk Demanded raw milk Profit 
Dairy A 
1 
1 0.09Aw   1
0.29Ax   1 0.0510A   
2 
1 0Aw   1
0Ax   1
0A   
Dairy B 
1 
1 0Bw   1
0Bx   1
0B   
2 
2 0.27Bw   2
0.52bx   2 0.0156B F    
Producer 
1 
1 0.09Aw   1
0.29Ax   1 0.0170P   
2 
2 0.27Bw   2
0.52bx   2 0.0935P   
 
For scenario 2 of the basic model, the highest price dairy A is able to offer 
when dairy B enters the market equals 0.26A Aw p c    and dairy B’s highest 
price is given by 0.30B Bw p c   . If dairy A has not contracted the producer 
and rival B enters the market, dairy B is able to outbid dairy A by offering a 
slightly higher price for raw milk, say 0.27Bw  , given Bertrand competition. 
Then, dairy A has a profit of zero and dairy B achieves
B . The producer’s 
expected payoff is given by 
P  (see table 2.2). 
Comparing the two scenarios shows that the Bertrand price competition leads 
to a higher price in scenario 2 compared to scenario 1 and a higher quantity of raw 
milk. This results in more than a fivefold producer’s profit. The example 
demonstrates dairy A’s incentive to deter rival B’s market entry due to the higher 
profit that can be achieved in the monopsonistic case. From the producer’s 
perspective, it would be better if the rival processor enters the market, as this 
results in higher competition for raw milk and thus in a higher price.  
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For dairy A, holding the monopsony position on the market can only be 
achieved with an exclusive contract that obliges the producer to deliver the full 
production of raw milk. For the producer to accept, the contract must enclose a 
compensation for not being able to negotiate/contract with dairy B. Therefore, the 
compensation must at least contain the difference between producer’s profit in 
Scenario 2 and 1. Consequently, the compensation must be 0.0765P  . Dairy A’s 
profit in scenario 1 is 0.051A   and zero in scenario 2, therefore the highest 
compensation dairy A is able to offer equals 0.051A  . This compensation is not 
high enough for the producer to accept, therefore market entry of dairy B will take 
place. Without taking risk aversion into consideration, dairy A cannot deter market 
entry of dairy B. Dairy B will enter the market and Bertrand competition for raw 
milk occurs.  
Risk attitude and uncertainty of entry 
The compensation that dairy A is able to offer depends on the expected entry 
probability of the rival. Producer’s required compensation also depends on the 
entry probability and further on the risk attitude. Consequently, both affect the 
possibility to deter the rival’s entry. The relationship of affordable and required 
compensations for entry deterrence depending on entry probability and the risk 
attitude is presented in figure 2.2. The bold line represents the compensation dairy 
68   2.3 The Model 
A is able to offer (
A -line). The thin lines represent the compensation that the 
producer requires under a given level of risk attitude (
P -lines). 
Figure 2.2: Development of compensations depending on probability 
 
Generally, the figure shows that given our numeric assumptions and if risk 
aversion of the producer is not lower than 0.1r  , entry cannot be deterred if the 
entry probability is higher than 0.552k  . All compensation lines of the producer  
(
P -lines) lie above dairy A’s compensation line ( A -line) after this point. If 
k=0.522 and r=0.1 then 0.02815risk riskP A   . Therefore, if 0.1r  , an exclusive 
contract and an entry probability of 0.552k   lead to an effectively deterred entry. 
Addressing the risk attitude of the producer, rival’s entry can only be deterred if 
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0.6r   and if the entry probability is low enough respectively. Starting from a risk 
behavior of 0.6r  , entry cannot be deterred (all P -lines lie above the A -line 
there). For a risk averse producer with 0.6r   the entry probability would need to 
be very low ( 0.018k  ) to effectively deter rival’s entry with an exclusive 
contract. With increasing risk aversion of the producer and with decreasing entry 
probability, the required compensation of the producer is decreasing. However, at 
the same time, the compensation that dairy A is able to offer decreases with 
decreasing entry probability. This shows that under our assumptions regarding 
marginal costs of production and processing, there are certain ranges of interaction 
between entry probability and risk attitude where the incumbent dairy A can use an 
exclusive contract to deter rival dairy B’s entry. 
2.4 Discussion 
Even though the concentration of dairy processors is increasing, the entry of rivals 
into an incumbent’s market area is still relevant. In the dairy concentration process, 
processing quantities are continuously increasing which leads to larger market 
areas (AMI 2014). Hence, a rival’s entry can also be interpreted as an existing 
dairy who wants to increase its market area.  
Certainly, the above presented model covers a complex market structure and 
therefore relies on abstract assumptions. The complexity of the market presents 
itself in the different relations along the supply chain. On the one hand, considering 
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the relation between producers and dairies, the model does not take into account 
the possible existence of producer organizations. These might exert bargaining 
power in contrast to the model assumption of the producer being a price taker. On 
the other hand, regarding the relation between dairies and the downstream market, 
the model lacks to cover the possible existence of buyer power of downstream 
firms. However, in order to focus the analysis on the relation between the producer 
and the dairy, perfect competition on the downstream market was assumed. 
Nevertheless, both assumptions might be worth to relax in future studies.  
As cooperatives are exempted from the policy of compulsory and exclusive 
written contracts, our analysis focused on investor-owned dairies. However, the 
theory of exclusive contracts can also be applied to cooperatives. The literature 
provides three possible profit maximizing objectives for cooperatives (Royer and 
Matthey, 1999). First, cooperatives act like investor-owned firms, they maximize 
profit and afterwards split profit between members. Second, cooperatives 
maximize total member welfare by maximizing profit over quantities. However, 
this is not applicable to the milk market due to the obligation to supply the entire 
production amount to the same dairy. Third, cooperatives maximize the price paid 
to their members and generate a zero profit. Therefore, our theory can be applied to 
cooperatives if we assume that the cooperative e maximizes its profit like an 
investor-owned firm. Then, the compensation corresponds to the shared profit of a 
cooperative. The model does also not change for the entrant, who can then either be 
an investor-owned dairy or a cooperative. If we stick to the assumption that the 
fixed costs of market entry are too high for the entrant to offer a compensation, the 
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theory can completely be translated to the case of cooperatives that maximize 
profits like investor-owned firms. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this article, we analyzed entry deterring effects of exclusive contracts in an 
oligopsonistic market. The model is based on the framework of studies analyzing 
exclusive contracts in the literature (e.g. Segal and Whinston 2000; Rasmusen et al. 
1991; Aghion and Bolton 1978, Fumagalli and Motta 2006). In contrast to these 
models on exclusive contracts, we incorporate risk aversion of the producer and 
uncertainty of rival’s entry. In our model, we assume increasing marginal cost of 
the raw milk producers and an exogenous downstream market price. The rival’s 
entry can effectively be deterred under certain combinations of the rival’s entry 
probability and producer’s level of risk aversion. Increasing farmer’s risk aversion 
reduces the compensation the producer requires to sign an exclusive contract. This 
implies that producer foregoes uncertain higher prices in a competitive market 
environment for the compensation paid.  
Generally, the producer is better off in terms of profit in case of market entry 
of the rival dairy. Only for rather high values of producer risk aversion and low 
entry probability of the rival, the incumbent dairy can use an exclusive contract to 
deter market entry. According to empirical studies, the majority of producers prefer 
a short-term contract period up to two years (Schlecht et al. 2013) and the 
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possibility to change the processor on a short notice. In addition, short cancellation 
periods and extraordinary termination clauses are preferred by the majority of 
producers which is perceived as a strong bargaining instrument for a better milk 
price (Steffen et al. 2009). These requests are reflected by our model, which shows 
that the possibility to change the processor is beneficial for the producer as he can 
achieve a higher milk price when the rival dairy processor enters the market. Long-
term contracts combined with the obligation to supply and long cancellation 
periods reduce competition on the raw milk market. To assure decision flexibility 
for farmers regarding their contractual relationship and to improve their ability to 
change processors in case of unsatisfactory raw milk pricing, we conclude that 
contracts should have appropriate cancellation periods. 
From the perspective of the dairy processor there is always an incentive to 
keep the monopsonistic position on the market. This occurs because market entry 
of the rival results in market foreclosure for the incumbent as the producer will 
offer all production to the rival who can pay the better price. The market entry of 
the rival does not lead to another monopsony as we assume that the incumbent is 
still active with its processing facilities and wants to regain its market share on the 
market. Therefore, the rival has to maintain its competitive pricing strategy in order 
to prevent the incumbent from re-entering the market.  
Reflecting our results in light of the German sector inquiry on milk, we find 
that it is possible that a dairy processing company abuses its dominant position 
with long-term contracts, long cancellation periods and the obligation to supply. 
Therefore, from a competitive standpoint, it is essential to consider these findings 
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in the contract design so that the flexibility of farmers to change processor at least 
in the medium term is not completely erased. 
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Abstract 
Addressing the increasing concentration of dairy processors in Germany, this paper 
investigates imperfect competition on the German raw milk market. Using a panel 
data set of dairy processors’ price and processing data as well as related market 
information for the years 2001-2012, the conjectural variation approach allows 
analyzing market power of dairy processors towards raw milk producers. In six out 
of the twelve federal states analyzed, significant results indicating to an 
oligopsonistic market structure of the dairy industry are found, where price 
deviations from perfect competition range between 1% and 14%. Also on the 
national level, the null hypothesis of a perfectly competitive dairy industry has to be 
rejected. 
Keywords:  market power, imperfect competition, conjectural variation, 
dairy industry 
JEL classification: D43, C51, L13Formelabschnitt (nächster) 
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Chapter 3  
Conjectural variations on the German raw milk market– 
an empirical investigation of buyer market power
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3.1 Introduction 
The competitiveness of the dairy sector in Europe is driven by the abolition of the 
quota regime, increasing productivity and structural change on both dairies’ and 
farmers’ side. In the last years, following the decision to abolish the milk quota, 
raw milk production in Germany increased, accompanied by a continuing decrease 
in number of dairy farmers and processors (BLE 2013; ZMB 2013). Due to the 
high perishableness of the good, farmers’ access is limited to only those dairy 
processors within a certain radius around the farm. The high concentration of dairy 
processors and the rather inelastic supply of raw milk might foster the possibility of 
dairy processors to exercise market power.  
To estimate market power, the conjectural variation approach in the framework of 
the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) (Appelbaum 1982, Bresnahan 
1982 and Lau 1982) has been frequently used in various industries, mainly 
assessing retailer market power (e.g. Gohin and Guyomard (2000) for the French 
food retailing considering milk, Anders (2008) for the German food retailing 
considering meat, Sckokai et al. (2009) for the cheese market in Italy). Regarding 
buyer market power estimation on milk markets, the literature provides several 
studies that use the conjectural variation approach to analyze seller or buyer market 
power. Relevant research on buyer market power of dairy processors has been 
conducted by Perekhozhuk et al. (2011), Cakir and Balagtas (2012), Scalco and 
Braga (2014) and Perekhozhuk et al. (2014). Evidence has been found for some 
regions of the Ukrainian dairy industry (Perekhozhuk et al. 2014) and the 
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Hungarian dairy industry (Perekhozhuk et al. 2011). No evidence on the contrary 
has been found for regional milk markets in Brazil (Scalco and Braga 2014) and for 
US dairy cooperatives (Cakir and Balagtas 2012). 
Being the first study estimating market power of the German dairy industry, the 
objective of this paper is to investigate potentially existing imperfect competition 
on the national and federal state level. We use plant-level data covering all German 
dairies from 2001 to 2012 providing information on their geographical location, 
raw milk prices, processing quantities, legal and production specifics as well as 
relevant farm related data. The geographical limitation of the market is 
incorporated by estimating market power on the federal state level (similar to 
Perekhozhuk (2014) and Scalco and Braga (2014) who also estimate on a regional 
level). Due to non-availability of labor and capital quantities we use the approach 
proposed by Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) and adopted by Scalco and Braga 
(2014) using only prices for these inputs.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First, the paper gives an 
overview on the German milk market and its developments. Then, related literature 
and methodology applications are presented. Section 3.4 presents the theoretical 
background of the conjectural variation approach while section 3.5 provides the 
empirical model. Estimation results are then presented and finally discussed in 
section 3.8. Section 3.9 concludes. 
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When analyzing competition on the German raw milk market, it is important to 
incorporate the spatial nature of the market into the model. Raw milk is a highly 
perishable good leading to an economically acceptable transportation radius of at 
maximum 200 km (FCO 2012). Hence, farmers’ selling alternatives are limited to 
the processors located close to their farm which can lead to strong dependencies 
deterring competition and optimal price setting (IFH 2009). Therefore, increasing 
concentration of dairy processors leads to concerns regarding market power (FCO 
2009). Further, federal states’ differences in raw milk prices might result from 
different market power intensity of the embedded dairy industry. 
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the regional distribution of raw milk production 
and dairy processing facilities in Germany in 2012. The map shows differences in 
dairies’ concentration that are different in North and South Germany. In the North, 
structural change was strong, reducing the number of dairy facilities from 111 to 
58, a decrease of 48% between 2001 and 2012. In the South, structural change was 
not as strong with the number of plants decreasing by 26% from 70 to 52. This 
change was not accompanied by a decrease in the total amount of milk processed 
but instead by a massive increase of average processing quantity by 104% in the 
North and 30% in the South. The average processing quantity of a dairy has, on the 
other hand, strongly increased from 133,600 tons to 199,863 tons as well as the 
sum of the processing quantity (26.3 Mio tons in 2001 to 27.4 Mio tons in 2012).  
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Figure 3.1: Regional distribution of milk production and dairy processing facilities 
in 2012 
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Table 3.1 shows a high variance of German dairies’ concentration in the federal 
states measured as processing quantity of the top 1 (C1) to 3 (C3) biggest 
processors relative to total processing quantity in the corresponding federal state. 
Further, the processing quantities and the average milk price are summarized. 
Table 3.1: Dairies’ concentration according to processing quantities in 2012 
state C1 C2 C3 
no. 
dairies 
proc. quantity  
in Mio. tons 
avg. raw milk 
price 
in ct/kg 
HE 0.83 0.99 1 3 0.1439 0.3189 
SN 0.72 0.82 0.89 6 1.5270 0.3169 
BB 0.7 0.94 1 3 1.1164 0.3099 
LS 0.69 0.85 0.89 12 5.7000 0.3188 
RP 0.57 0.99 1 3 2.7928 0.3119 
TH 0.49 0.8 1 3 0.1527 0.3183 
MV 0.44 0.86 0.94 4 1.4131 0.3282 
SH 0.41 0.52 0.63 12 1.5459 0.3152 
BW 0.4 0.58 0.75 15 1.8533 0.3240 
ST 0.32 0.6 0.81 6 0.5397 0.3153 
NW 0.29 0.52 0.64 11 2.9113 0.3221 
BY 0.08 0.15 0.2 59 6.7631 0.3282 
With HE=Hesse, SN=Saxony, BB=Berlin and Brandenburg, LS=Lower Saxony, 
RP=Rhineland Palatinate, TH=Thuringia, MV= Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 
SH=Schleswig-Holstein, BW=Baden-Wuerttemberg, ST=Saxony-Anhalt, NW=North 
Rhine-Westphalia, BY= Bavaria 
 
Concentration and raw milk price are negatively correlated (-0.61). Bavaria (BY) 
paid the highest price in 2012 and is also the state with the lowest concentration 
and the biggest processing state, followed by Lower Saxony. The highest 
concentration can be observed in Hesse (HE), Rhineland-Palatinate (RP) and 
Berlin and Brandenburg (BB). As illustrated in figure 3.1, compared to Bavaria 
(BY) in the south of Germany, federal states in the North show a much higher level 
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of concentration (Lower Saxony (NI) 0.69, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
(MV) 0.44, Schleswig Holstein (SH) 0.41).  
3.3 The conjectural variation approach 
Generally, market power refers to the extent to which an entity is able to influence 
the price of a good. Economic theory primarily analyses seller market power where 
under imperfect competition firms output price exceeds marginal costs (Motta 
2004). Buyer market power opposed to input suppliers on the other hand, has not 
been analyzed as fiercely but is highly relevant for agricultural markets due to the 
oligopsonistic structure of the food processing industry (MacDonald et al. 2004; 
Sexton 2013). Buyer market power refers to the ability to set the price for an input 
below the competitive level (Clarke et al. 2002).  
With the conjectural variation approach, the deviation from the competitive 
level of raw milk prices can be measured while incorporating strategic interactions 
between firms (Bresnahan 1982; Appelbaum 1982; Lau 1982). Conjectural 
variation models usually incorporate the analysis of a homogeneous good industry, 
where a conjectural variation or conduct parameter gives information on the degree 
of market power in the industry. Generally, for the estimation of oligopsony power, 
a supply function of the input good and the first order profit maximizing function 
of the analyzed industry are simultaneously estimated.  
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Concerning studies that analyze market power on dairy markets, a study that 
analyzes oligopoly power of dairy processors has been conducted by Mérel (2009). 
Evidence for seller market power of the French comté cheese processing dairies is 
not found in this study. Estimating both, oligopoly and oligopsony power, Sckokai 
et al. (2009) estimate market power in the Italian cheese market, finding stronger 
evidence for oligopoly than oligopsony power. 
Notable studies specifically analyzing oligopsony power of dairy processors 
are Perekhozhuk et al. (2009), Perekhozhuk et al. (2011), Cakir and Balagtas 
(2012), Perekhozhuk et al. (2014) and Scalco and Braga (2014). The main 
difference between these studies is the availability of the data and the therefore 
different estimation possibilities. As Perekhozhuk et al. (2014) and Perekhozhuk et 
al. (2011) have data on output and input quantities of the dairy industries, they can 
estimate a translog production function of dairies. Perekhozhuk et al. (2014) 
estimate the production function, a farmers’ supply function and a first order profit 
maximization function of dairies simultaneously in a nonlinear three-stage least 
squares estimation. They analyze plant level data and find evidence for oligopsony 
power of dairy processors in three of 25 administrative regions in Ukraine. 
Keeping milk supply elasticity constant, Perekhozhuk et al. (2011) use industry 
level data and find evidence for oligopsony power in the Hungarian dairy industry.  
In contrast to Perekhozhuk et al. (2011) and Perekhozhuk et al. (2014), Muth 
and Wohlgenant (1999) and Scalco and Braga (2014) do not have data on output 
and input quantities except for the product analyzed (beef in Muth and 
Wohlgenant’s case and raw milk in Scalco and Braga’s case). They use the profit 
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maximizing amounts of these quantities expressed in prices. Scalco and Braga 
(2014) simultaneously estimate raw milk supply and the first order profit 
maximizing condition of dairies, derived from a translog production function with 
a nonlinear Generalized Method of Moments procedure. They find evidence for 
market power of the dairy industry in some of the analyzed regions in Brazil. Muth 
and Wohlgenant (1999) use three alternative production functions for the 
derivation of the first order profit maximization function which is estimated 
simultaneously with the supply function in a nonlinear least squares procedure. 
Concerning the production function, they derive a reduced-form expression of a 
marginal product function which they transform to represent a translog production 
form and a generalized Leontief production form. All three specifications do not 
reveal evidence for oligopsony power in the beef packing industry in the US. 
Our model is based on the specification developed by Muth and Wohlgenant 
(1999) and adopted by Scalco and Braga (2014) to estimate a model with fewer 
data requirements. As Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) and Scalco and Braga (2014), 
we do not have data on output and other input quantities except for raw milk. 
Therefore, we follow the theoretical framework developed by Muth and 
Wohlgenant (1999) and substitute optimal profit maximizing inputs depending on 
output and input prices. For the production function of dairies, we derive a 
reduced-form expression of a marginal product function, which we transform to 
represent a generalized Leontief production form. 
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Assume that the inverse supply of raw milk a dairy faces is given by  
( , )a aM W Mw f X Z  (3.1) 
where Mw  represents the raw milk price and ( )
a a
M Mj Mi MiX x x x   the demand in 
the competitive area a of dairy. This demand depends on the demand of dairy i and 
on the demand of all other dairies j in that area whose demand is also depending on 
the demand of dairy i. 
aZ  are factors that influence the supply capacities of the 
farms like number of dairy cows, price for young bulls and feed costs in the 
respective area. The competitive area is defined with a spatial weighting matrix 
which will be explained in the empirical model 
Each dairy produces a homogeneous output q . Consequently, the profit function 
of a representative dairy i can be written as 
* * * *( , , ) ( , )a aq M L K W M M L L K KP f x x x f X Z x w x w x       (3.2) 
where 
* ( , , , )L L M L Kx x x w w p  and 
* ( , , , )K K M L Kx x x w w p  represent the optimal 
values of the input quantities labor and capital conditional on the input of raw milk, 
Mx . Dairies are assumed to be price takers on the markets for labor  Lw , capital 
 Kw  and also on the output market for dairy products  P . The first order 
condition for profit maximization is given by 
* *( , , )
1
q M L K
M
M
f x x x
w P
x


  
   
  
 (3.3) 
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where   M M M Mx w w x     represents the market price elasticity of raw milk 
supply a dairy is facing and * *( , , )q M L K Mf x x x x   reflects the marginal product of 
raw milk input.   is the conduct parameter which measures the conjectural 
elasticity. As we estimate the federal states’ dairy industries’ market power, this 
parameter can be interpreted as the average of conjectural elasticity of the firms in 
the industry of the federal state s,   
1
1 n s a a
s M Mi Mi M
i
x x x x
n



   . It comprises how 
other dairies’ quantity a
Mx  in area a changes when dairy i changes its quantity 
 aM Mix x   and the relation of dairy i’s quantity to the other dairies in the area 
 aMi Mx x . The wedge between price and marginal product is measured with the 
conduct parameter and gives information on the degree of market power on the 
input market for raw milk (Appelbaum 1982, Bresnahan 1982; Hyde and Perloff 
1995). Following Muth and Wohlgenant (1990), the conjectural variation 
parameter measures the response to a percentage increase in total industry input to 
a 1% increase of a certain firm’s increased input purchase. A conjectural elasticity 
of 0s   hints to a perfectly competitive input market where the price for raw milk 
equals marginal revenue product, whereas a 1s   indicates to a monopsonistic 
market. Intermediate values, 0 1s  , suggest the existence of an oligopsonistic 
market structure.  
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We estimate a reduced form model to address the endogeneity of raw milk prices 
and quantities by instrumentalizing both variables. Ideally, raw milk supply and the 
first order condition are estimated simultaneously (Muth and Wohlgenant 1999, 
Perekhozhuk 2014; Scalco and Braga 2014). However, a simultaneous nonlinear 
three-stage least squares estimation was not feasible in our case. 
For our reduced form approach, we estimate the supply elasticity first which is 
then used in the estimation of the first order condition. The supply of raw milk is 
estimated in a two stage least squares estimation to address the endogeneity of raw 
milk quantity and price. A lagged raw milk price, wage, capital costs, output price 
and fuel prices serve as instruments. The fitted values of the instrumentalized raw 
milk price are then used to estimate the raw milk supply a dairy is confronted with 
(equation (3.1)): 
0
1
ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln n ln
ln ln
M priv s s M M F
s
B FM M BM M
FB MM M M TM
C T L l K k
x priv stateDum w afeed
apbulls afeed w apbulls w
afeed apbulls w w t wm
acows t aw aw
    
  
  
   

    
    
     
   

, (3.4) 
where the variable priv indicates whether a dairy is organized as cooperative or 
investor–owned firm, stateDum are dummies for the federal states, afeed, apbulls 
and acows contain information on feed prices, prices for young bulls and number 
of cows in the competitive area of a dairy, respectively. As the conjectural 
variation approach measures interactions between firms, this supply is also 
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depending on the quantities and prices competing dairies offer. In contrast to other 
studies (Muth and Wohlgenant 1999; Perekhozhuk 2014; Scalco and Braga 2014) 
we therefore incorporated the labor  law  and capital costs  kaw  of dairies in 
dairy i’s competitive area as indicators for their demand.  
The competitive area is defined, following Zavelberg and Storm (2015), with 
a spatial weighting matrix tW  of size  t tN N  with tN  being the number of 
dairies in year t. The elements of tW  are defined as 1ijtw   if farm i  and j  are 
neighbors and 0ijtw   otherwise (also 0ijtw  if i j ). Competitors are defined as 
the nearest dairies that together produce at least as much as the considered dairy. 
The supply elasticity is given by 
ln
ln
ln ln ln
M
M
M FM BM MM M TM
x
w
afeed apbuls w T

    



    
. (3.5) 
By using the data of the competitive area, we ensured that we get a unique supply 
elasticity for each dairy i. This elasticity is then used for the estimation of the first 
order condition (equation (3.3)) where Mx  is instrumentalized with the fitted 
values of Mx  of the supply equation. 
Following Muth and Wohlgenant (1999), we assume a reduced-form marginal 
product specification and assume a fixed proportion technology such that 
Mq x : 
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* *
0
( , , )q M L K
M M L L K K P
M
f x x x
x w w P
x
    

    

. (3.6) 
Muth and Wohlgenant (1999) assume first, this reduced form specification, second, 
a translog and third, a generalized Leontief production function. We tested all three 
specifications and got similar parameter estimates. The best model fit is achieved 
with the partial derivative of a generalized Leontief production function where the 
variables in equation (3.6) are substituted by their square roots. Using the partial 
derivative of a generalized Leontief production function in the first order condition 
(equation(3.3)) leads to 
 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/20 1M M M L L K K Pw P x w w P

    

 
       
 
. (3.7) 
To estimate this function, nonlinear fixed effects panel estimation is used. 
Reformulation of equation (3.7) leads to  
         1/2 1/2 1/2 1/20diff diff diff diff diff
diff
1
M M L L K K P
M
P Px Pw Pw PP
w
    


   

 
 
 
 (3.8) 
where all variables are defined as the difference from their ID specific mean, 
 diff mean( )var var var   with 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 , , , ,M L Kvar P Px Pw Pw PP . 
To estimate market power for the dairy industry in each of the federal states 
analyzed, the market power parameter in equation (3.8) is defined as follows: 
1
n
s s
s
stateDum 

 .  (3.9) 
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3.6 Data Description 
We use a panel data set containing yearly information for the time span 2001-2012 
and focus on conventional processing dairies. The data on dairies’ type of 
production, processing quantity, legal form and raw milk prices was gathered by 
the AMI (Agrarmarkt Informations-Gesellschaft mbH). As we were not able to 
obtain data on product portfolios and the wholesale prices received by dairy 
processors, P  serves as a price indicator for the national average selling price for 
butter, cheese, skim milk, whole milk and whey powder (Milchtrends 2015). 
Information on wages in the dairy industry was collected from the statistical offices 
of the federal states in Germany. Yearly national interest rates for corporates with a 
rate fixation up to 1 year was obtained from the European Central Bank (European 
Central Bank 2015). Regarding variables for milk supply, number of cows are 
available from EUROSTAT (EUROSTAT 2015), feed costs from the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN 2015) and the prices for young bulls from the 
Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI 2015). 
Data on transportation costs (fuel) are sourced from the Association of the German 
Petroleum Industry
 
(Mineralölverband 2015). 
The data that is used for the estimation is summarized in the following table.  
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Table 3.2: Description of model variables 
variable Description unit descriptive statistics* 
Mx  Yearly quantity of procured 
raw milk by dairy 
processors in Germany  
kg mean: 1.85e+08, SD.: 3.28e+08 
min: 908000, max: 3.15e+09 
Mw  Yearly average price for 
raw milk paid by dairy 
processors 
ct/kg mean: 0.31, SD.: 0.03 
min: 0.22, max: 0.41 
Priv Dummy variable. Dairy is 
cooperative or privately 
owned 
- - 
stateDum Dummy variable for 
location of dairy 
- - 
Lw  Hourly wage for workers in 
the dairy industry on federal 
states basis 
€/h mean: 15.30, SD.: 2.72 
min: 10.91, max: 21.06 
Feed average feed costs per cow 
in federal states 
€/cow mean: 642.90, SD.: 182.06 
min: 349.90, max: 1610.83 
Cows sum of dairy cows in federal 
states 
- mean: 721,454,2, SD.: 469,889.4   
min: 107,950, max: 1,384,600 
Fuel yearly average price per 
litre diesel fuel in federal 
states basis 
€/l mean: 115.85, SD.: 15.71 
min: 94.58, max: 143.04 
Kw  Yearly national interest rate 
for corporates, rate fixation 
up to 1 year 
% mean: 4.31, SD.: 0.76 
min: 2.99, max: 5.67 
P  price index containing the 
national average selling 
price for butter, cheese, 
skim milk, whole milk and 
whey powder 
 €/kg mean: 2.31, SD.: 0 .28 
min: 1.85, max: 2.94 
Pbulls National price for young 
bulls 
€/100 
kg 
carcass 
weight 
mean: 302.22, SD.: 42.05 
min: 249.07, max: 397.09 
*Descriptive statistics are calculated for the whole dataset across all observations. 
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3.7 Estimation results 
Several specifications of the supply function were tested to obtain the best model 
fit ( 2 0.174R  , see Appendix for full results). The displayed federal states’ supply 
elasticities are the aggregation of firm specific supply elasticities (see table 3.3). 
However, as the coefficients used for the calculation of the supply elasticities are 
not statistically significant, they have to be regarded with caution. 
Table 3.3: Supply elasticity 
BB LS HE NW MV ST 
0.722 0.725 0.790 0.793 0.803 0.808 
SN TH SH BY BW RP 
0.810 0.957 0.961 1.049 1.133 1.191 
 
The aggregated supply elasticities are all close to unity and positive, reflecting a 
rather elastic supply function.  
Table 3.4: National market power parameter 
 Estimate 
 
Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
  0.0100 *** 0.0009 10.7620 < 2e-16 
P  -0.5191 *** 0.0136 -38.0480 < 2e-16 
M  0.0000 *** 0.0000 6.0960 0.0000 
L  0.0159 *** 0.0007 22.7190 < 2e-16 
K  0.0309 *** 0.0009 36.3150 < 2e-16 
0  1.1450 *** 0.0305 37.5760 < 2e-16 
2 0.6565R   
Signif. Codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, . 0.1  
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The estimation of a national market power parameter for the whole dataset results 
in a conduct parameter that is statistically different from zero at the 0.001 level of 
significance (see table 3.4). Hence, we can reject the null hypothesis of a perfectly 
competitive market. The estimate suggests the existence of an oligopsonistic 
market structure. However, the parameter value is close to zero. The response to a 
1% increased raw milk input demand of a certain firm leads to a 0.01 % increase of 
the whole dairy industry’s input. The price distortion reflected by D   , 
measures the price deviation from marginal revenue product. The national price 
deviation is equal to 1%. Hence, the price is 1% lower than in a perfectly 
competitive market. 
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Table 3.5: Market power parameters for the federal states 
 Estimate 
 
Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
SH  -0.0690 *** 0.0050 -13.7590 < 2e-16 
LS  0.0131 . 0.0077 1.7150 0.0866 
NW  0.0192 *** 0.0055 3.5060 0.0005 
HE  -0.0301 
 
0.0363 -0.8290 0.4070 
RP  0.1725 *** 0.0136 12.6500 < 2e-16 
BW  0.0537 
 
0.0350 1.5340 0.1252 
BY  0.0233 ** 0.0074 3.1720 0.0015 
BB  -0.0236 
 
0.0188 -1.2540 0.2099 
MV  0.0014 
 
0.0047 0.3020 0.7625 
SN  0.0441 *** 0.0038 11.7230 < 2e-16 
TH  0.0452 *** 0.0095 4.7660 0.0000 
ST  -0.0315 ** 0.0119 -2.6450 0.0083 
P  -0.5220 *** 0.0140 -37.2890 < 2e-16 
M  0.0000 *** 0.0000 6.2100 0.0000 
L  0.0158 *** 0.0008 20.4960 < 2e-16 
K  0.0305 *** 0.0009 33.9970 < 2e-16 
0  1.1510 *** 0.0312 36.9330 < 2e-16 
2 0.8508R   
With HE=Hesse, SN=Saxony, BB=Berlin and Brandenburg, LS=Lower Saxony, 
RP=Rhineland Palatinate, TH=Thuringia, MV= Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 
SH=Schleswig-Holstein, BW=Baden-Wuerttemberg, ST=Saxony-Anhalt, NW=North 
Rhine-Westphalia, BY= Bavaria 
Signif. Codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, . 0.1  
The estimation of the conduct parameters for the federal states’ dairy industries 
shows non-significant results for Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Berlin and 
Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, proofing the null hypothesis 
of perfect competition (see table 3.5). For Schleswig-Holstein (SH) and Saxony-
Anhalt (ST) the parameter estimates are significantly negative. Evidence for an 
oligopsonistic market structure is provided in six federal states (LS, NW, RP, BY, 
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SN, TH). Except for Rhineland-Palatinate ( 0.1725RP  ), the parameter values 
show a rather low response of the dairy industry’s input with respect to a single 
dairy’s input change, the parameters are close to zero.  
Table 3.6: Oligopsonistic price distortion 
BY LS NW RP SH SN ST TH 
0.0222 0.0164 0.0242 0.1448 -0.0718 0.0545 -0.0390 0.0472 
 
Accordingly, Rhineland-Palatinate shows the highest price distortion (see table 
3.6). 
3.8 Discussion 
Due to the non-significant impact of explanatory variables of the supply estimation 
that enter the supply elasticity calculation, the estimates of the market power 
parameters have to be regarded with caution. A specification of the supply function 
similar to Perekhozhuk et al. (2014), without incorporating the reactions of other 
dairies in the competitive area, does not improve the model fit of the supply 
function. Resulting elasticities are more inelastic, however, with respect to the 
results, different specifications of the supply function do not lead to major changes 
of the conduct parameters. Expressing variables as differences from the mean could 
also not improve the model fit of the supply estimation. Generally, we do not have 
a high correlation between the raw milk price Mw  and the processed quantity Mx  
 ( , ) 0.12M Mcorr x w   . This might influence the validity of the supply function 
and the solving of the three-stage least squares estimation negatively.  
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The estimation results show that not all conjectural variation parameters are in 
the theoretical meaningful range  0 1  , but almost all are close to zero. These 
results are in line with those found by Scalco and Braga (2014) who found market 
power parameters for Brazilian regional dairy industries ranging between -0.02 and 
0.08. They reject the hypothesis of a monopsony for all regions and the hypothesis 
of perfect competition for some of the regions. However, as the parameters are 
close to zero, they conclude that the distortion from oligopsony power is rather 
small and that the market is close to perfect competition.  
Our results provide evidence for an oligopsonistic market structure in six 
federal states and also on the national level. However, the market power parameter 
estimates indicate to a small impact of oligopsony power of a single dairy on the 
whole dairy industry. Except for Rhineland-Palatinate where we find the highest 
market power parameter. Rhineland-Palatinate is also a state with a high 
concentration of dairies (see table 3.1). Concerning the correlation between the 
market power parameter and the concentration indices, we find a small positive 
correlation with the C2 (share of the two largest processing dairies in the 
corresponding state) and the C3 indicator (share of the largest three dairies) that we 
presented in table 3.1 (see table 3.7). 
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Table 3.7: Correlation coefficients between conduct parameter and concentration 
 
C1* C2 C3 
  -0.0003 0.218478307 0.1750 
* Concentration classes measured as quantities of largest processors relative to total processing 
quantity in the corresponding federal state, adapted from Table 3.1 
These findings are especially important with respect to the assumed positive effects 
of concentration on market power as stated in the milk market survey of the cartel 
authority (BKA 2012) and also in empirical literature (Jank, Farina and Galan 
1999; Martins and Faria 2006). However, we have to keep in mind that we can 
only measure concentration with respect to processing quantities and not as usually 
practiced with the Herfindahl Hirschmann Index. Furthermore, the results reveal 
that the hypothesis of perfect competition is rejected for Bavaria, a state with a 
high number of dairies and low concentration. Furthermore, the results suggest a 
perfectly competitive market for Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, a federal state 
with a high concentration of dairies. 
Even though most of the significant conduct parameters are close to zero, the 
price distortions for the low conduct parameters range between -7% (SH) and 5% 
(SN). Hence, our results indicate that the raw milk price is 5% lower than it would 
result under perfect competition in Saxony. Even for Bavaria the price distortion is 
2%. The highest price distortion is observed in Rhineland-Palatinate with 14%. 
3.9 Conclusion 
This study contributes to the ongoing discussions about low raw milk prices, 
market power and further concentration of dairy processors, especially in light of 
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the quota abolition. Evidence for an oligopsonistic market structure is found in six 
federal states (LS, NW, RP, BY, SN, TH), while the results suggest a perfectly 
competitive market in four federal states (HE, BW, BB, MV). On a national level, 
the null hypothesis of perfect competition needs also to be rejected. Even though 
most of the significant market power parameters are close to zero, price deviations 
from perfect competition range between 1% and 14%. However, these findings 
have to be regarded with caution as the estimation of the supply elasticity 
parameters was not significant.  
Regarding future research, there are several data requirements that may 
improve the estimation of market power and bring more insights on the German 
raw milk market behavior. A production function of the dairies that comprises 
output quantities and prices on dairy plant level would be beneficial for the 
estimation. With such data, the market power parameters could be estimated more 
precisely incorporating the different marketing channels and product portfolios of 
single dairies. As we could not obtain this kind of data, we used a national price 
index for dairy output and had to assume a fixed proportion technology. However, 
a variable proportion technology would be more appropriate. Further, more 
detailed information on input quantities or prices other than raw milk would be 
helpful to incorporate specific characteristics and economies of scales. As the 
market power parameter crucially depends on the elasticity of supply, it is highly 
important for future research to improve this estimation with appropriate data. The 
estimation with the competitive area of dairies is used to depict the supply a dairy 
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is facing. However, the size of the competitive area may be underestimated. The 
competitive area crucially depends on the size of a dairy and its neighbors. The raw 
milk collection area might however be larger. Further, cross border effects are not 
incorporated. Hence, the estimation would benefit from more detailed information 
on the competitive area that would really give an idea how large the competitive 
areas of dairies are and how many competitors they have. This would also provide 
a more accurate measure for concentration. With our rather crude measure for 
concentration, depending on the processing quantities of dairies in the federal 
states, we find only a small correlation between concentration and buyer market 
power.  
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Table 3.8: Estimation of supply function 
 Estimate  Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
0  -1578.000 
 
1389.000 -1.136 0.256 
priv  -0.225 *** 0.060 -3.772 0.000 
SH  -0.721 *** 0.172 -4.198 0.000 
LS  0.049 
 
0.125 0.389 0.697 
NW  0.525 ** 0.161 3.267 0.001 
HE  -0.275 
 
0.250 -1.097 0.273 
RP  2.861 *** 0.290 9.879 < 2e-16 
BW  0.702 *** 0.165 4.264 0.000 
BB  0.566 * 0.238 2.379 0.018 
MV  0.781 *** 0.204 3.839 0.000 
SN  0.385 . 0.209 1.839 0.066 
TH  -0.423 * 0.200 -2.112 0.035 
ST  -0.233 
 
0.206 -1.132 0.258 
M  -1069.000 
 
1133.000 -0.944 0.345 
F  -7.262 
 
7.447 -0.975 0.330 
B  -14.720 
 
19.710 -0.747 0.455 
C  0.000 ** 0.000 3.047 0.002 
T  0.844 
 
0.742 1.137 0.256 
MM  1.381 
 
3.414 0.405 0.686 
L  -2.002 *** 0.477 -4.198 0.000 
K  0.301 
 
0.348 0.863 0.388 
FM  -0.916 
 
1.810 -0.506 0.613 
BM  -5.002 
 
11.650 -0.429 0.668 
TM  0.551 
 
0.595 0.926 0.354 
FB  1.094 
 
1.185 0.923 0.356 
2 0.1714R   
Signif. Codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, . 0.1  
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Abstract 
This paper analyses differences in the pricing behavior between cooperatives and 
investor-owned dairies for raw milk in a spatial market setting. We systemize the 
theoretical literature concerning the relations between price and space in 
oligopsonistic markets. This provides the foundation for empirically analyzing the 
price-space relationship in the German raw milk market. Space represents the 
distance to competing dairies and transportation cost. We differentiate between 
cooperatives and investor-owned dairies in North and South Germany. Specifically, 
the impact of a dairy’s own legal form and that of neighboring competitors on the 
pricing behavior is assessed. For the South of Germany, a negative relationship 
between space and raw milk price is found while for the North the relationship is 
positive. In both North and South, the effect is stronger for cooperatives compared to 
investor-owned firms. Overall, our findings do not necessarily suggest an increase in 
market power and a decrease in raw milk prices when the concentration process of 
the dairy sector is progressing. Further, this paper provides the first spatial analysis of 
the competitive yardstick effect, for which we find weak evidence in the South. For 
the north, the theory of the competitive yardstick effect cannot be supported 
empirically. The estimation is based on a panel-data set covering all German dairies 
from 2001 to 2012 providing information on raw milk prices, processing quantities, 
legal and production form. 
Keywords: imperfect competition, spatial competition, competitive 
yardstick 
JEL classification: D43, R32, C51Formelabschnitt (nächster) 
                                                     
* This paper is currently under review at the German Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
Chapter 4  
Pricing behavior of cooperatives and investor-owned 
dairies under spatial competition
*
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Raw milk markets are typically spatially limited due to the high perishableness of 
the commodity. Therefore, dairy processors compete for raw milk in a certain 
market area. Understanding the effects of a spatial market setting on raw milk 
prices is getting more important as the ongoing concentration process among 
processors may increase their local monopsony power.  
The literature provides several theoretical studies deriving positive, negative and 
inverted U-shaped relations between price and space
10
. In the analysis of mixed 
markets, the competitive yardstick effect is also evaluated suggesting a 
procompetitive effect of neighbouring COOPs on IOFs’ pricing (Cotterill 1987; 
Sexton 1990; Rogers and Sexton 1994; Alvarez et al. 2000; Zhang and Sexton 
2001; Fousekis 2011a and b; Tribl 2012). However, only few studies conduct an 
empirical analysis on spatial pricing behaviour. The pioneer in this field is the 
empirical analysis of Alvarez et al. (2000) which focuses on the relation between 
price and space on the milk market in the Asturias region. Following this study, 
Huck et al. (2006), Graubner et al. (2011)
11
 and Koller (2012) focus on the German 
milk market. Alvarez et al. (2000) theoretically derive an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between price and space
12
, which they could verify in their empirical 
estimation with data on investor-owned firms (IOFs). Based on Alvarez et al.’s 
                                                     
10 Usually defined as distance to competing firms multiplied by transportation costs.  
11 Graubner et al. (2011) use a vector error correction model and find low price transmission. This 
methodology is however not relevant for our study. 
12 Also defined as the distance to neighboring dairies multiplied by unit transportation costs. 
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(2000) framework, Huck et al. (2000) focus on the analysis of a cooperative 
(COOP) market only. They theoretically derive an inverted U-shape relationship 
between price and space that lies above the one of IOFs, implying a higher raw 
milk price of COOPs. The empirical results for a region in Northern Germany 
support the shape of the curve but they do not empirically analyse the price spread 
between COOPs and IOFs. Koller (2012), also building upon Alvarez et al. (2000), 
empirically shows an inverted U-shaped relationship between price and space for 
Germany. However, as they use a panel model with fixed effects, they cannot 
differentiate between effects of legal forms of dairies. The competitive yardstick 
effect has been evaluated mostly theoretically (Cotterill 1987; Sexton 1990; 
Fousekis 2011a; Tribl 2012). Empirically, Hanisch et al. (2013) find evidence for 
Germany in a national-level analysis of the European dairy market. 
Besides (i) providing a literature review categorizing the existing findings on 
relations between price and space, this paper, in contrast to former empirical 
studies on spatial pricing, (ii) differentiates between the effects of space on COOPs 
and IOFs in the North and the South of Germany while incorporating effects of 
neighbouring dairies’ characteristics on raw milk pricing in a spatial regression 
analysis. Additionally, (iii) the competitive yardstick is analysed on firm-level in 
this spatial setting. 
To investigate to what extent dairies can exercise monopsony power, we explore 
the relationship between price and space, defined as the average distance to 
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neighbouring dairies multiplied by unit transportation costs. We employ a spatial 
regression approach to analyse if and how raw milk prices are influenced by space 
and by neighbouring dairies’ characteristics, such as legal and production form. 
The results allow comparing the shape of the relationship between price and space 
to the theoretically derived relationships in the literature. In this spatial context, we 
analyse the competitive yardstick effect. Therefore, and to incorporate the different 
objectives of COOPs and IOFs, we differentiate between the pricing behaviour of 
these two legal forms in our empirical analysis. Additionally, we distinguish 
between North and South Germany to account for different market structures. The 
estimation is based on a data set covering all German dairies from 2001 to 2012 
providing information on dairies’ location, raw milk prices, processing quantities, 
legal and production form. 
4.2 Relevant literature on spatial pricing 
To asses to what extent monopsony power can be exercised in a spatial market, the 
investigation of the relation between price and space is essential. In order to 
systemize the relevant literature, table 4.1 summarizes the identified relationships 
between price and space and the main underlying assumptions. The price-space 
relationship may have an inverted U-shape, a monotone negative or a monotone 
positive relationship. The relationship depends on the type of market actors (mixed 
or pure IOF or COOP markets), pricing (uniform delivered pricing (UD) where the 
dairy pays the shipping or free on board shipping (FOB) where the farmer pays the 
shipping), competition (Hotelling-Smithies (H-S) or Löschian Competition) and 
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COOPs objective function and membership policy (net average revenue product 
pricing (NARP) or total member welfare maximization (TMW), open membership 
(OM) or restricted membership (RM)).  
Table 4.1 also reports whether the competitive yardstick was confirmed. This 
theory states that COOPs have a procompetitive effect in a mixed market. It builds 
on the assumption that COOPs, which are owned by farmers and do not have to 
deal with shareholders, will not accept prices below average cost. This pricing will 
serve as a yardstick for other market actors and thus influence the prices of 
competing IOFs, which leads to market prices equal to average costs in the long 
run (Cotterill 1987). Hanisch et al. (2012) validate the competitive yardstick effect 
in a country level analysis of the European dairy industry. They find that the higher 
the market share of COOPs, the higher the milk farm price. In a theoretical 
framework of spatial competition, the competitive yardstick could also be 
confirmed (Sexton 1990; Tribl 2012; Fousekis 2011a). 
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Table 4.1: Summary of relevant literature 
 
Author 
Year 
Market 
actors 
Pricing/ 
conjecture 
theory: 
 relation price - space 
Empirical 
estimation 
CYE comment 
Sexton 
(1990) 
IOF & 
COOP
1,2,3 
 
FOB 
H-S, Lösch, 
Cournot 
bounded line market  
no explicit relation derived 
/ confirmed 
 
focus on farm-retail price spread depending on 
the different assumptions on competition, market 
actors and NARP function 
Rogers & 
Sexton 
(1994) 
IOF & 
COOP 
FOB 
H-S, Lösch, 
Cournot 
bounded line market  
positive relation: Lösch, IOF 
negative relation: H-S, Cournot, IOF 
negative relation: Lösch, H-S, mixed market 
/ confirmed focus on farm-retail price spread, 
space measured as transport cost 
Alvarez et 
al. (2000) 
IOF UD 
Lösch 
unbounded line market  
inverted U-shape 
confirms 
theory 
/  
Zhang & 
Sexton 
(2001) 
IOF FOB, UD 
H-S 
bounded line market  
negative relation 
/ / focus on strategic choice of FOB or UD  
Fousekis 
(2011a) 
IOF & 
COOP
1,3
 
UD, FOB 
H-S 
bounded line market  
negative relation 
/ partially 
confirmed 
CYE depends on pricing 
Fousekis 
(2011b) 
COOP UD , FOB 
H-S 
bounded line market  
negative relation 
/ 
 
/  
Huck et 
al. (2012) 
COOP
1,4 
 UD 
Lösch 
unbounded line market  
inverted U-shape 
confirms 
theory 
/ assumptions as Alvarez et al. (2000), 
inverted U-shape for COOPs, lying above IOF 
Koller 
(2012) 
IOF & 
COOP 
UD 
Lösch 
unbounded line market  
inverted U-shape 
confirms 
theory 
 
/ review of Alvarez et al. (2000),  
no theoretical analysis of spatial pricing in a 
mixed market, 
no differentiation between legal forms due to 
fixed effects 
Tribl 
(2012) 
IOF & 
COOP
1,3
 
UD 
Lösch 
bounded line market  
negative relation of price and space for all 
scenarios 
/ 
 
confirmed analysis of simultaneous and sequential games 
under different assumptions on COOPs choice of 
market radius  
 1
open membership, 
2
restricted membership, 
3
NARP, 
4
TMW 
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Table 4.1 shows that only few studies prove their theoretical findings 
empirically. These studies are conducted on the milk market in Spain by Alvarez et 
al. (2000), in Germany by Koller (2012) and in the German federal state Schleswig 
Holstein by Huck et al. (2012). All three studies are based on the theoretical 
framework of Alvarez et al. (2000) who derive a U-shaped relationship of price and 
space based on the assumptions of an IOF market and an unbounded line market, 
which allows for competition in the backyard. In this setting, when space is 
relatively unimportant (i.e. firms are located close to each other or transportation 
cost are low), the market areas of rival firms may extend beyond the other firms’ 
location leading to increasing prices in space. According to Alvarez et al. (2000), 
this follows from UD pricing and Löschian competition leading to a price matching 
behavior of dairies. Under UD pricing, dairies are responsible for the shipping 
costs such that they are willing to increase market area until profits are zero for the 
most distant farm. Consequently, if a dairy raises its price, it will reduce its market 
area losing some farmers at the boundary. Due to price-matching behavior, the 
dairy expects its rival to increase its price as well. Hence, the market area of the 
rival is also decreasing and the dairy can capture the farmers in the own backyard 
abandoned by the rival. Those are more profitable compared to the ones it loses at 
its market boundary, leading to higher profits under UD pricing. If space gets more 
important (due to higher transportation costs or a higher distance to neighboring 
dairies), competition takes place only between the firms’ locations and implies a 
negative relation between price and space in line with the theory of a bounded line 
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market applied in other studies (see Sexton 1990; Zhang and Sexton 2001; Tribl 
2012; Fousekis 2011a and 2011b). The negative relation between price and space is 
explained by the inverse relationship between transportation costs and market area 
between firms, which may result in separated monopsonistic markets. In the 
empirical studies of Alvarez et al. (2000), Huck et al. (2012) and Koller (2012), the 
inverted U-shape is shown for an IOF market, a COOP market and a mixed market, 
respectively. Even though Koller (2012) did an empirical analysis for Germany 
there is no differentiation between legal forms as a panel model with fixed effects 
is used. 
The inverted U-shape mainly stems from the assumption of the unbounded 
line market. Studies that assume a bounded line market mainly derive a negative 
relationship, independent of assumptions on market actors, pricing and conjecture 
(Zhang and Sexton 2001; Fousekis 2011a & 2011b; Tribl 2012). However, Rogers 
and Sexton (1994) find a positive relation between price and space (defined as 
transportation costs) for an IOF market under FOB pricing and Löschian 
competition. The reasoning is that firms’ market radius does not overlap under 
FOB pricing. In combination with Löschian competition firms try to keep their 
market areas and match price changes of their competitors. Hence, the relation 
between price and transportation costs is positive as firms increase prices with 
market area to cover farmers’ transportation costs. In Rogers and Sexton’s (1994) 
analysis, this positive relation is only valid for the competition of IOFs. In a mixed 
market, they only consider the case of a COOP facing an upward sloping NARP 
curve. In this scenario, the relation between price and space gets negative. This 
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negative relation can be explained as follows. If the IOF gains a larger market area 
due to a price increase, the COOPs sales are decreasing, which leads to an increase 
in average fixed costs. Hence, the price the COOP can pay to its members 
decreases. This leads to separate markets of the COOP and the IOF, hence lower 
competition and a negative relation between price and space. Furthermore, Rogers 
and Sexton (1994) analyze IOF markets with FOB pricing and Hotelling or 
Cournot behavior and a mixed market with Hotelling behavior which all result in a 
negative relation between price and space. 
4.3 Data and Empirical Model 
We use a panel data set containing yearly information on the German milk market 
for the time span 2001-2012. The data provides information on dairies’ type of 
production, processing quantity, legal form and raw milk prices and was gathered 
by the AMI
13
. The raw milk prices are for milk of grade one with 4.2% fat and 
3.4% protein including additional payments, such as boni for large delivered 
quantities or loyalty, net of costs like quality assessment or storage costs allowing 
for comparability of the raw milk prices. Additionally, we compose a performance 
index (perf) by using the awards for the best dairy products from the German 
magazine Milch Marketing (Milch Marketing (years 2001-2012)). The index 
calculates as the sum of award points over the observed period and used as a proxy 
                                                     
13Agrarmarktinformationsstelle, a German institution that collects data of agricultural entities 
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for the output performance. Data on transportation costs (t) are sourced from the 
Association of the German Petroleum Industry
14
. 
Following Alvarez et al. (2000), Huck et al. (2012) and Koller (2012), we 
define neighbors as the nearest dairies that together produce at least as much as the 
considered dairy
15
. Our analysis is restricted to conventional dairies; however, for 
the neighboring definition, also organic dairies are included. The reasoning is that 
organic milk prices might influence conventional prices as farmers in the long run 
could switch to organic production when the price spread gets too high. As in 
Alvarez et al. (2000), we use the neighboring definitions in order to calculate the 
average distance of a dairy to its neighbors (nDist) and the importance of space as 
product of average distance to neighbors and transportation cost, s t nDist  16. 
Further, we use the neighboring definition to setup a spatial weighting matrix tW  
of size  t tN N  with tN  being the number of dairies in year t. The elements of 
tW  are defined as 1ijtw   if farm i  and j  are neighbors and 0ijtw  otherwise 
(also 0ijtw  if i j ). The spatial weighting matrix is row standardized and used to 
calculate the neighboring share of COOPs (wCoop) and organic dairies (wOrganic) 
as well as the number of neighbors (numNeig).  
                                                     
14Data is published at www.mwv.de.  
15Due to the identification of the location with postal codes we observe a zero distance to neighbours 
for some dairies. However, this does not mean that they have zero number of neighbours which is not 
possible according to our neighbourhood definition.  
16Transportation cost are measured as the yearly average price per litre diesel fuel. This is in line with 
Alvarez et al. (2000). Huck et al. (2012) and Koller (2012). This definition implicitly assumes 
constant fuel consumption per kilometre over the sample period. To deviate from this assumption is 
not possible, however, as we have no information about changes in fuel efficiency over time. 
4.3 Data and Empirical Model 
 
 
115 
In 2012, 41 % of the German milk processors were organized as COOPs, 
processing 59 % of total milk supplied to dairies, the remaining are privately 
owned. As we focus on the differences between IOFs and COOPs while 
differentiating between North and South, table 4.2 summarizes the key facts for the 
year 2012.  
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Table 4.2: The milk market in 2012 – key facts 
  IOF COOP 
  North South North South 
Number of 
processing 
facilities 
total 
conv. 
org. 
37 
31 
6 
 
45 
32 
13 
29 
27 
2 
29 
20 
9 
Conventional 
raw milk price 
in ct/kg 
mean 
min 
max  
30.92 
22.32 
37.19 
 
32.19 
24.15 
38.65 
30.59 
21.84 
37.68 
32.12 
24.08 
40.85 
Organic raw 
milk price 
in ct/kg 
mean 
min 
max 
38.31 
32.13 
49.61 
 
39.72 
33.19 
50.34 
39.26 
33.75 
47.16 
39.21 
32.70 
51.57 
Conv. raw 
milk 
production 
in tons  
sum 
mean 
5.6 Mio 
183,848 
 
5.2 Mio 
165,476 
12.4 Mio 
460,873 
3.3 Mio 
166,057 
Org. raw milk 
production 
in tons 
sum 
mean 
173,994 
28,999 
 
241,179 
18,552 
18,004 
9,002 
188934 
20993 
Perf sum 
mean 
75 
5.32 
 
648 
20.25 
82 
3.04 
 
46 
2.3 
nDist*
 
mean 
min  
max 
38.5022 
0 
91.2841 
20.9388 
0 
68.0515 
37.0619 
0 
116.1928 
24.2491 
2.6426 
39.7549 
 
numNeig* Mean 
min (freq.) 
max 
 
2.42 
1 (14) 
11 
 
2.44 
1 (10) 
12 
 
3.15 
1 (9) 
16 
 
2.40 
1 (5) 
6 
 
 
Taking a closer look at the market structures in the North and South
17
 reveals that 
the market in the North is characterized by few large dairies opposed to the South 
with a high density of small dairies. From 2001 to 2012, the number of 
conventional dairy plants in the North changed from 111 to 58, a decrease of 48%, 
whereas the structural change in the South was not as strong with the number of 
                                                     
17 The South comprises the federal states Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg, the North the remaining 
federal states. 
4.3 Data and Empirical Model 
 
 
117 
plants decreasing by 26% from 70 to 52. This change was not accompanied by a 
decrease in the total amount of milk processed but instead by a massive increase of 
average processing quantity by 104% in the North and 30% in the South. This 
results in an 89% higher average processing quantity in the North compared to the 
South. The differences in dairies’ sizes and concentration of plants are also 
reflected in the market areas that we calculated. The average distance to neighbors 
is 33.92 km with a maximum distance of 91.28 km in the North compared to an 
average distance of 20.18 km with a maximum distance of 41.68 km in the South. 
Differences between North and South can also be observed in the prices that are 
lower in the North. Differences in COOP’s and IOF’s pricing cannot be seen 
clearly from table 4.2, this issue will be further analyzed in a multivariate 
regression in to following. Overall, a comparison of the descriptive statistics 
indicates substantial differences in the competitive conditions in the North and 
South leading to fundamental difference in the market structure and diverse 
developments over time. 
In our empirical analysis we estimate a spatially lagged explanatory variable 
model (SLX)
18
 of the general form y X WX      with y being a vector of the 
                                                     
18 The SLX model is an alternative to the more commonly use spatial lagged dependent variable 
model (SAR). In principle we could also use the SAR model in order to assess the effect on 
neighboring prices on own prices. However, Gibbons and Overman (2012) argue in a paper 
provocatively entitled “Mostly Pointless Spatial Econometrics?” that the SAR model suffers from an 
identification problem that is not appropriately addressed in the applied literature. Instead they 
proposed the SLX model as one appropriate alternative.   
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dependent variable, X a matrix of explanatory variables, W a row standardized 
spatial weighting matrix,   and   coefficients to be estimated and 
 20,N I   with I being an identity matrix. As a first step, we estimated a 
model including cross terms of all variables with the South dummy variable 
(SouthDum). In effect, this results in two different regressions for North and South. 
In a next step, we apply a model selection approach based on the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC). Specifically, we split our explanatory variables in two 
sets, where the first includes all variables related to s while the second includes all 
remaining variables
19
. Then, model specifications are estimated that can be formed 
from all possible combinations of the variables in the first set. The variables from 
the second set are always included. We then select the model specification with the 
lowest AIC. Following, a Wald test is used to test if all remaining insignificant 
variables from the second set can be jointly excluded. This selection process results 
in the following specification
20
 estimated with OLS, 
                                                     
19 Specifically, the variables related to s include s , 2s , s southDum , 2s southDum , s COOP , 
s COOP southDum  , 2s COOP , 2s COOP southDum   
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 (4.1) 
where isouthDum  and iCOOP  are dummy variables equal to one when a dairy i in 
year t is located in the South and a COOP respectively. Interaction terms between 
isouth  and itcoop  are used to find significant differences between North and South 
and between the legal forms respectively. The spatial lagged explanatory variables 
are 
1
N
it ijt jt
j
wCoop w Coop

  and 1
N
it ijt jt
j
wOrganic w Organic

  with ijtw  being 
elements of tW . 
4.4 Results 
The regression results are presented separately for North and South in table 4.3. 
The columns for South are constructed from the regression results by adding the 
estimated coefficients of the cross term between the south dummy and the 
respective variable to the estimated coefficients of the main effect of the variable. 
The p-value corresponds to the p-value from a Wald test, testing if the sum of the 
coefficient from the main effect and the coefficient from the cross term is 
significantly different from zero. In cases where the cross term with the south 
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dummy is dropped during the model specification the results for South and North 
are the same.  
Table 4.3: Regression results 
 
North South
a
 
 
Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
const  24.90 0.00 26.81 0.00 
COOP  -1.03 0.00 0.15 0.21 
wCOOP  -0.25 0.00 0.25 0.00 
wOrganic  0.71 0.00 0.71 0.00 
perf  0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 
numNeig  -0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.23 
s COOP  0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.05 
2s COOP  -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.00 
quant COOP  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
2001yearDum  14.29 0.00 13.24 0.00 
2002yearDum  10.05 0.00 9.40 0.00 
2003yearDum  8.39 0.00 7.25 0.00 
2004yearDum  7.37 0.00 5.97 0.00 
2005yearDum  6.14 0.00 5.28 0.00 
2006yearDum  5.43 0.00 4.41 0.00 
2007yearDum  11.59 0.00 9.80 0.00 
2008yearDum  9.51 0.00 10.32 0.00 
2010yearDum  6.28 0.00 4.85 0.00 
2011yearDum  9.58 0.00 8.07 0.00 
2012yearDum  5.92 0.00 5.05 0.00 
R² = 0.93; R²-adj. = 0.92, 2 = 0.99; N = 1761 
a In cases where a cross term is included in the model, the reported coefficient is equal to the sum of 
the coefficient of the main effect and the coefficient of the cross term. The p-value is then the p-value 
from a Wald test, testing if the sum of the coefficients from main effect and cross term is significantly 
different from zero.  
The estimated effect of space on price is plotted in figure 4.1 differentiating 
between North/South and IOF/COOP. Changes in s can result either from a change 
in transportation costs, from a change in density of neighbours, or simply from a 
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change in production quantity. For the interpretation of the relationships, however, 
it is important to keep in mind that we control for production quantity in our 
regression
21
. The figure thus shows the relationship between price and space while 
keeping production quantity (and all other variables) constant.  
Figure 4.1: Relation between price and space of COOPs and IOFs in the North and 
the South 
 
Note: for 2012. All other variables are at means. 
Figure 4.1 reveals opposite effects between price and space for North and South. 
However, the effects of a positive relation in the North and a negative relation in 
the South are only significant for COOPs. In contrast to Alvarez et al. (2000), Huck 
et al. (2012) and Koller (2012), we did not find a full inverted-U-shaped function 
                                                     
21 In the presented results the quant COOP  is included. However, the variable quant  was 
considered in the model selection process. Excluding the quant  variable has almost no effect on the 
estimated coefficients related to s . The interpretation is therefore unchanged.    
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but rather the first increasing part for the North and the decreasing part of the 
function for the South.  
The negative relation between price and space in the South is in line with the 
theory of competition between firms’ locations (Sexton 1990; Alvarez et al. 2000; 
Zhang and Sexton 2001; Tribl 2012; Fousekis 2011a and 2011b). In Germany, the 
dairy pays for the transportation costs and farmers receive the same price 
independent of their location (BKA, 2009), hence theoretical relations between 
price and space resulting under UD pricing are of interest. The theory finds that 
under UD pricing in combination with either Löschian or Hotelling-Smithies 
competition between firms’ location, prices are decreasing in space. Increasing 
space is equivalent to increasing transportation costs or increasing distance 
between firms’ locations. Market areas are decreasing resulting in less competition 
between firms which can lead to separated markets that allow for monopsonistic 
pricing. This negative relationship between price and space is supported by our 
empirical findings for COOPs in the South. 
The positive relation between price and space in the North could be explained with 
Alvarez et al.’s (2000) assumption of UD pricing, price matching behaviour and 
competition in the backyard (see section 2). The theory implies that when space is 
relatively unimportant, a firm increases its price and expects its rival to also 
increase its price (price matching behaviour). Higher prices lead to a reduction in 
the market area so that dairies gain farmers in their backyard. The assumption of 
competition in the backyard can be supported for the North as dairies maximum 
collection area is 170 km (BKA, 2009) which is larger than our derived maximum 
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distance to neighbours equal to 116 km (with an average distance to neighbours of 
37 km, see table 4.2). An alternative explanation for a positive relation between 
price and space is provided by Rogers and Sexton (1994) under the assumption of 
FOB pricing and Löschian competition, implying that dairies have to increase their 
prices so that farmers can cover the transportation cost. However, there is no 
evidence that FOB is practiced in the North.  
It is remarkable that the relationship between price and space is stronger for 
COOPs than for IOFs
22
. The literature reviewed does not provide an obvious 
explanation for this effect. However, a possible explanation is that under the open 
membership policy, which is currently practiced in Germany (BKA, 2009), COOPs 
cannot reject farmers that want to participate. Hence, the COOP must consider the 
available market as its market area and cannot choose the optimal market area as an 
IOF. Therefore, it is possible that COOPs tend to have a larger market area than 
IOFs (despite the same average distance to neighbours calculated here) and thus 
space has a stronger effect on COOPs. 
We observe that prices are generally higher in the South. This could stem from the 
general difference in the market structure of dairy farms resulting in lower raw 
milk production costs in the North (EMB 2013). Further, we find a positive relation 
between our performance variable and the South indicating that dairies in the South 
are producing more innovative and popular products that lead to higher output 
                                                     
22 Despite the fact that there is a bit more variation in s  for IOFs (std.=24.1) than for COOPs 
(std.=22.6). 
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prices. In the North, large dairies might benefit from economies of scale. Further, 
the market structure can influence the price differences between North and South. 
As already observed, the market in the South is much denser, potentially 
intensifying competition between processors. Farmers have more selling 
alternatives, which might influence the price positively. The higher concentration 
of dairies in the North leads to only limited selling alternatives likely supporting 
market power of dairies and a generally lower price. Lower prices in the North hint 
at lower competition. However, this is a contradiction to the theory of competition 
in the backyard. If competition would be low, there is no incentive for a dairy to 
raise its price under UD pricing. Anyway, based on the results it is difficult to draw 
conclusion about the fierceness of competition which is also not the objective. 
Nevertheless, what we can conclude is that space has opposing effects on COOPs 
in the South and the North and no significant effects on IOFs. 
Our regression results in table 4.3 show that COOPs pay a significant lower price 
than IOFs in the North (-1.03 ct/kg). In the South, COOPs pay a slightly higher 
price than IOFs (0.15ct/kg), however the effect is statistically not significant. These 
findings do not clearly support the general idea that COOPs pay higher prices as 
discussed in the competitive yardstick theory (Cotterill, 1987) and in Huck et al.’s 
(2012) theoretical analysis. However, other authors such as Cook (1995) Schramm 
et al. (2005) and EMB (2012) point out that the general idea of a COOP to 
maximize the welfare of members is debatable. As all members receive the same 
price and a COOP must not differentiate between members there is a free-rider 
problem. Furthermore, the heterogeneous risk levels of members influence 
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investment decisions which in turn may negatively influence producer prices 
(Gerlach et al. 2006, BKA, 2009; Steffen et al. 2009). Hence, the lower price of 
COOPs may result from the fact that COOPs produce rather basic milk products 
like fresh milk and milk powder instead of innovative brand products (BKA, 2009; 
Steffen et al., 2009). We aim to control for such effects using our performance 
indicator (see section 4.3). This indicator is indeed on average higher for IOFs (see 
table 4.2) supporting the notion of IOFs being more innovative. We also find a 
positive effect of the performance index on the raw milk price. However, it might 
well be that the rather crude indicator does not fully capture product differences 
between COOPs and IOFS such that the COOP dummy still picks up some of these 
effects. 
We checked the robustness of the model with respect to different neighbouring 
definitions. Specifically, we defined neighbours as all dairies that together produce 
at least a multiple of the own production quantity (e.g. all neighbours that together 
produce at least twice as much as the own quantity). Changes in the neighbouring 
definitions did not lead to a meaningful change of the results with respect to the 
main conclusions. 
In order to analyse whether COOPs are beneficial for competition as suggested by 
the competitive yardstick effect, we use the neighbouring share of COOPs (wCoop) 
to test the hypothesis that a higher share has a positive effect on raw milk prices. 
This hypothesis is only supported in the South, where we find a significant positive 
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influence of the share of COOPs in the neighbourhood on the price (see figure 4.2). 
For the North we find a significant negative effect. The negative effect for the 
North is consistent with the finding that COOPs in the North pay a significantly 
lower price as IOFs (-1.03 ct/kg). In both cases, however, the effect of the share of 
COOPs in the neighbourhood are rather small from an economic perspective as 
prices change by only -0.25/+0,25 ct/kg from zero COOP share to full COOP share 
in the North and South, respectively. Cross terms of the neighbouring shares of 
COOPs with the legal form could not improve the model. Hence, we observe no 
significant differences of the effects of wCOOP on the legal form. Hanisch et al.’s 
(2013) national analysis finds support for the competitive yardstick theory in 
Germany. In contrast to their study, we conducted a firm level analysis. However, 
we find no clear empirical support for the competitive yardstick theory in 
Germany.  
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Figure 4.2: Relation between price and share of COOPs in neighbourhood 
 
Note: Estimated relationship for the year 2012. All other variables are at means. 
Furthermore, our regression results show a positive influence of a high share of 
organic dairies in the neighbourhood. To our knowledge, there is no study that 
analyses the effects of organic prices on conventional prices. We find this effect to 
be higher in the North than in the South.  
4.5 Conclusion 
Unlike other empirical studies on milk markets (Alvarez et al. 2000; Huck et al. 
2012; Koller 2012) we empirically estimate the relation between price and space in 
a mixed market, differentiating between different market structures. In contrast to 
these studies, we could not find a complete inverted U-shape of the relation 
between price and space. However, our empirical study reveals significantly 
different effects between price and space in the North and South of Germany that 
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could result from the same effects as the inverted U-shape discussed in the 
literature. For the North, the relation between price and space is positive which can 
be explained by the effects of competition in the backyard. In the South, the 
relation between price and space is negative which is in line with the theory of 
competition on a bounded line market or an unbounded line market without 
competition in the backyard. Hence, both empirical findings can be interpreted in 
line with the theory. However, it is not clear why competition in the backyard 
should not exist in the South. Unfortunately, our results do not allow drawing 
conclusions in this respect. 
Remarkably, significant effects of space on price are only found for COOPs. 
A possible explanation for this can be that due to the open membership policy, 
COOPs cannot discriminate between members preventing them from serving an 
optimal market radius as IOFs do. Hence, space is more important for COOPs.  
Generally, we observe that prices are higher in the South which might result 
from the higher density of dairies fostering competition, a higher performance of 
dairies and higher production costs of farmers. In the North, large dairies may 
profit from economies of scales and lower production costs of farmers.  
An interesting finding is that COOPs’ prices in the North are significantly 
lower than IOFs’ prices while in the South, COOPs’ prices are not significantly 
higher than IOFs’ prices. This does not confirm the general idea of COOPs that 
maximizes member welfare resulting in high prices for farmers. An explanation for 
the lower prices of COOPs in the North could be that the single farmer’s voting 
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right in large COOPs is very small. This may lead COOPs behaving more like 
shareholder maximizing IOFs. Additionally, COOPs are on average less innovative 
than IOFs, potentially explaining the lower COOP price in the North. These 
findings underline the fact that we do not find clear empirical evidence for the 
competitive yardstick effect. Even though an increase in the share of neighbouring 
COOPs in the South increases prices, this effect is rather small from an economic 
perspective. For the North we found the exactly opposite effect, which is in line 
with our finding that the COOPs in the North pay significantly lower price than 
IOFs. In both cases however, even though the effects are significant, they are rather 
small from an economic perspective.  
Overall, our findings suggest that a further concentration of the milk 
processing sector does not necessarily lead to an increase in market power and a 
decrease in prices. Our analysis, differentiating between legal forms, reveals that 
space is irrelevant for IOFs. Only for COOPs space matters for pricing behaviour 
with opposing effects for North and South.  
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